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REACTION AND REFORM: TRANSFORMING THE JUDICIARY
UNDER ALABAMA'S CONSTITUTION, 1901-1975
Tony A. Freyer*
Paul M. Pruitt, Jr.**
During the twentieth century Alabama's Constitution of 1901
proved resistant to change. At the turn of the century, the constitution
emerged from a predominately small-town, rural society and a political
order controlled by a Democratic Party committed to white supremacy.
Over the course of the seven decades that followed, amid the Great De-
pression, World War II, and the Civil Rights struggle, leaders of the
state's social and political order appealed to the legitimacy the constitu-
tion represented to justify the status quo.1 Ultimately, with the support
of the United States Supreme Court and the federal judiciary, the na-
tional government, and Northern public opinion, African-Americans
overcame the Alabama Constitution's sanction of Jim Crow. This was
a case of forced change. Alabamians revealed, however, a greater facil-
ity for adapting the constitution to changing times in the campaign to
reform the state's judicial system which lawyers organized under the
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leadership of Chief Justice Howell Heflin from 1970 to 1975. Although
judicial reform did not directly raise issues of racial injustice identified
with civil rights, it nonetheless presented a similar threat to the estab-
lished political power structure and social order.3 In the mid-1950s, an
effort to reform Alabama's judiciary failed primarily because it was
associated with federal authority and its defense of equal justice.4 Hef-
lin and his fellow attorneys avoided the same fate largely because they
shaped their campaign to the newer demands of the market for legal
services, effectively undercutting the political and social inertia the
constitution had reinforced.5
Article VI of the 1901 Constitution left primary control of the judi-
cial branch to the Legislature.6 Over the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury the Legislature authorized a proliferation of local courts. Legisla-
tors also granted the supreme court conditional authority to establish
rules of procedure throughout the state's court system, but the exercise
of this power remained contingent on legislative approval, encouraging
the supreme court's inaction.7 The constitution's sanction of legislative
control of judicial organization and procedure perpetuated a decentral-
ized judicial system dominated by the small town society and the De-
mocrats' one party rule which characterized Alabama until the 1950s. 8
However, during the following decade, despite persistent poverty and
mounting civil rights conflict, Alabama's population was for the first
time predominately urban and more than ever connected to the national
consumer economy. The growth of urban population altered the demand
for legal services, accentuating the divergence between the small town
Bar of general practitioners and urban firms constituted largely of cor-
porate defense attorneys and plaintiff's lawyers, who were themselves
divided on the basis of the clients each represented. As a result, on both
the supply and demand side of the market for legal services, the delays,
inefficiencies, and susceptibility to favoritism the decentralized judicial
3. G. ALAN TARR & MARY CORNELIA ALDIS PORTER, STATE SUPREME COURTS IN STATE
AND NATION 69-123 (1988).
4. But see Chief Justice Howell T. Heflin, Rule-Making Power, 34 ALA. LAW. 263, 264
(1973) (stating that "the inherent problems of legislative procedure thwarted the adoption of
modern comprehensive civil rules.").
5. See Charles D. Cole, Judicial Reform In Alabama: A Survey, 4 CUMB. L. REV. 41
(1973); Robert Martin, Alabama's Courts-Six Years of Change, 38 ALA. LAW. 8 (1977); see
also supra notes 1, 3; see also discussion infra Parts I, II.
6. ALA. CONST. art. VI, § 139 (repealed 1973); see also A GUIDE TO ALABAMA COURT
PROCEDURES 1 (1996).
7. See ROBERT J. FRYE, THE ALABAMA SUPREME COURT: AN INSTITUTIONAL VIEW 86
(1969); Richard H. Gill, The Proposed Alabama Appellate Rules: An Overview, 26 ALA. L. REV.
639 (1974); Jacob A. Walker Jr., The Proposed New Rules of Appellate Procedure, 35 ALA.
LAW. 144 (1974).
8. See sources cited supra notes 1, 3.
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system fostered were increasingly the subject of public criticism.9
The defeat of judicial reform during the mid-1950s evidenced the
established order's grip on the judicial system. Nevertheless, changes in
Alabama's professional legal culture and the urbanization of the state's
economy encouraged Heflin and his fellow reformers to believe that a
campaign for judicial reform through constitutional revision could
achieve success.'0 Unlike the fundamental issues of racial justice moti-
vating Alabama's civil rights struggle, judicial reform involved techni-
cal matters of procedure and process; yet the underlying issues of
changing the center of power and accountability were similar." Even
so, Heflin and the lawyers were engaged in a campaign of constitutional
revision and described themselves as reformers; as such, they were part
of a reform tradition that law professionals associated with the Progres-
sive movement that developed early in the twentieth century. 2 By the
1960s and 1970s, these reforms had acquired new focus under the lead-
ership of the American Judicature Society and a federal agency, the
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA).13 Heflin brought
these resources to bear in support of the Alabama lawyers' reform
campaign." A leading study gives Heflin much of the credit for the
success of this effort; Heflin himself, however, ascribed the reform
campaign's ultimate triumph to the ability of the state's lawyers to at
last attain control of their profession from the old order. 5
This Article examines the origins and triumph of the movement to
amend the constitution's judicial article. The argument is that reform
was the expression of activism by the Alabama legal profession. Al-
though changes in Alabama's social and economic order were a precon-
dition for the reformers' success, the inertia inherent in the state's poli-
tics could only be overcome through an effective campaign to mobilize
support among the general public and legal professionals alike. Even
so, individuals made a difference. Part I locates the twentieth century
development of Alabama's legal profession in the slowly changing
9. See discussion infra Parts I, II.
10. See generally sources cited supra notes 3, 5, 7.
11. See generally sources cited supra notes 2, 3, 5, 7.
12. See sources cited supra notes 5, 7; see also MICHAL R. BELKNAP, To IMPROVE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY 1-32 (1992);
Thomas W. Scroggins, Judicial Reform in Alabama: A Historical Perspective Twenty Five Years
Later 12 (1997) (unpublished student paper, The University of Alabama School of Law) (on file
with the Alabama Law Review) (addressing the role of the Law Enforcement Assistance Admini-
stration (LEAA) in Alabama's judicial reform effort).
13. BELKNAP, supra note 12, at 171-266.
14. Id. at 220, 247, 267-68; see Scroggins, supra note 12, at 2, 5-11.
15. Compare Chief Justice Howell Heflin, Acceptance Address to American Judges'
Association (Nov. 20, 1975), reprinted in Scroggins, supra note 12, at 2 (sharing the award with
state court officials "without [whose] efforts it would not have come about."), with TARR, supra
note 3, at 90, 93-97.
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demographic and cultural trends, including racial struggle, which con-
stituted a market for legal services under the Constitution of 1901. The
social and political dynamics shaping the proliferation of local courts
and the consequences of the supreme court's failure to exercise leader-
ship in its rule-making authority, which the civil rights conflict drama-
tized, are the themes of Part II. Part III considers how the defeat of the
reform measures in the mid-1950s influenced the Alabama Bar's and
Howell Heflin's efforts to initiate a new reform movement, culminating
in Heflin's election as Chief Justice in 1970 on a platform urging the
transformation of the constitution's judicial provisions. Part IV de-
scribes and analyzes the reasons for the success of Heflin's two-phase
reform campaign, which aimed first at the Legislature and then at the
process of constitutional revision itself. A conclusion follows.
I. THE TWENTIETH CENTURY SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT OF
THE MARKET FOR LEGAL SERVICES
Throughout the century, basic demographic factors were central to
the gradually changing demand for legal services. In the early and mid-
dle decades of the twentieth century, Alabama's demographic changes
were steady if unspectacular. The state's population increased from
2.35 million in 1920 to 3.27 million in 1960.16 Meanwhile the black
population gradually declined, from nineteenth century levels of nearly
50% to about 30% in 1960."7 Black citizens were still a majority in sev-
eral Black Belt counties, but black migration to Birmingham, Mobile,
Montgomery, and various Northern cities was ongoing throughout the
period.18 Such numbers parallel a general movement of Alabamians to
urban areas. Though only 28% of the state's citizens lived in towns or
cities in 1930, by 1960 Alabama was no longer a predominantly rural
state. 19
Steel-making remained Alabama's most visible industrial enterprise
during these years, and Birmingham remained a great steel-making cen-
ter. 20 With the exception of the aerospace development centered in
Huntsville in the 1950s and 1960s, most of the state's industries-iron
and steel manufacturing, mineral extraction, lumbering, and textiles-
were continuations of "New South" enterprises. 21 However, agriculture
16. See ROGERS, supra note 1, at 376-77, 465-66, 477, 545, 593.
17. Id.
18. DONALD B. DODD, HISTORICAL ATLAS OF ALABAMA 119, 124, 135-37 (1974); see THE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ALABAMA 135-36 (1998).
19. See DODD, supra note 18, at 119, 124, 135-37; ROGERS, supra note 1, at 376-77, 465-
66, 477, 545, 593; ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ALABAMA, supra note 18, at 135-36.
20. DODD, supra note 18, at 99-121; see ROGERS, supra note 1, at 443-47, 581-83.
21. DODD, supra note 18, at 99-121; see ROGERS, supra note 1, at 443-47, 581-83.
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was more diversified over the course of the twentieth century. Faced
with the onset of the boll weevil, farmers in the southeastern Wiregrass
turned from cotton planting to peanut production.' Farmers in the
Black Belt, the Tennessee Valley and North Alabama continued to grow
cotton while many landowners experimented successfully with cattle or
chicken raising operations.'
Unfortunately such enterprises did not bring about general prosper-
ity. Alabama's rural population continued to include large numbers of
tenant farmers and sharecroppers, black and white, many of whom
were deeply in debt to landlords.24 Many industrial workers earned the
low wages typical of extractive industries.25 The Great Depression de-
stabilized the lives of poor Alabamians and forced thousands to seek
relief through federal programs. 26 Even the boom times of World War
II and the military buildup of the Cold War could not reverse the state's
persistent poverty. 27 A demographic historian has noted that, as late as
the 1960s, Alabama "ranked 46th in housing, 47th in per capita in-
come, and 45th in education" among the states. 8
In dealing with the cultural demography of twentieth century Ala-
bama, we are compelled to deal with questions of race and segrega-
tion-matters which seemed inseparable to white citizens of the time.
The physical separation of the races had become an issue of politics,
law, and religion immediately after the Civil War.29 In the hundred
years which followed, a web of statutes, state and federal court deci-
sions, municipal ordinances and customs had affected near-total segre-
gation in schools, churches, public accommodations such as water foun-
tains and restrooms, transportation facilities, places of residence, and
places of work.30 Similar restrictions were applied, on a de facto basis,
to residents of all-white "mill villages" who lived, worked, worshiped,
shopped, and went to school in facilities controlled by owners of the
local mill.3
In terms of political demography, blacks and lower-class whites
were not so much segregated as quashed. The state's 1901 Constitution
was the product of an alliance between Black Belt landowners and ur-
22. DODD, supra note 18, at 99-121; see ROGERS, supra note 1, at 443-47, 581-83.
23. DODD, supra note 18, at 99-121; see ROGERS, supra note 1, at 443-47, 581-83.
24. See ROGERS, supra note 1, at 453-56, 465-83, 487-93, 566-88.
25. See id. at 465-93.
26. See id.
27. See id. at 566-88.
28. DODD, supra note 18, at 121.
29. PETER KOLCHIN, FIRST FREEDOM: THE RESPONSES OF ALABAMA'S BLACKS TO
EMANCIPATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 107, 108-27, 143-45, 170-71 (1972).
30. See ROGERS, supra note 1, at 255-57, 260-64, 274, 547-48; SHELDON HACKNEY,
POPULISM TO PROGRESSIVISM IN ALABAMA 43, 44-45, 181-82 (1969).
31. WAYNE FLYNT, POOR BUT PROUD: ALABAMA'S POOR WHITES 98-107 (1989).
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ban business interests. The constitution's voter registration mechanisms
disenfranchised nearly all black voters and significant numbers (eventu-
ally, a third or more) of white voters. 32 The Democratic Party was su-
preme in Alabama at the cost of making "white supremacy" its funda-
mental message. Even the most brilliant and well-intentioned white
Alabamians found it difficult to distance themselves from provincial
orthodoxy. For example, Hugo Black's early involvement with the Ku
Klux Klan shows how reformism and racism were intertwined.33 To this
world of political and cultural constraints, the 1954 Brown decision
34
and subsequent activism and legislation posed a profound threat. Of
course, Brown also brought the threat of change into the lives of the
lawmakers, lawyers, and judges in whose interest it was to maintain the
old regime.
Demographic changes among legal professionals in Alabama mir-
rored the slow-moving patterns of the general population. A State Bar
Association survey of 1922 found just over 1,300 lawyers in practice,
whereas the Martindale-Hubbell directories for 1932 and 1952 contain
the names of over 1,500 and 2,000 Alabama lawyers, respectively.35
University of Alabama law professor John C. Payne conducted a statis-
tical analysis of the 1965 Martindale-Hubbell and found more than
2,700 entries for Alabama. 36 Yet he concluded that only 1,950 individu-
als made up "the full-time practicing profession," a distinct, but not
dramatic increase over the size of the Bar forty years earlier.37 The
geographical distribution of Alabama lawyers likewise remained steady.
In 1922, more than 29% of the state's attorneys lived in Jefferson
County, which is home to Birmingham.38 More than four decades later,
Payne's statistical study showed that 851 legal professionals, 31.3% of
32. HACKNEY, supra note 30, at 147-79; MALCOLM COOK MCMILLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL
DEVELOPMENT IN ALABAMA, 1798-1901: A STUDY IN POLITICS, THE NEGRO, AND
SECTIONALISM 352-55 (1955); ROGERS, supra note 1, at 343-57.
33. See ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY 59-121 (1994). Of course, men-
tion of law and racial segregation conjures up images of the extra-legal forms of racial control
used by white Southerners and all too often winked at by law enforcement officials, notably
lynching. See generally Glenn Feldman, Lynching in Alabama 1889-1921, 48 ALA. REV. 114
(1995) (giving narrative and statistical information about lynching in Alabama from 1889-1921).
34. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
35. Proceedings of the Forty-Fifth Annual Meeting of the Alabama State Bar Association, 45
ALA. ST. B. ASS'N 110-27 (1922) [hereinafter 45th Proceedings]; 1 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL
LAW DIRECTORY, pt. 1, 1-19 (64th ed. 1932) [hereinafter MARTINDALE-HUBBELL 1932]; 1
MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY, pt. 1, 1-27 (84th ed. 1952) [hereinafter MARTINDALE-
HUBBELL 1952].
36. John C. Payne, A Statistical Analysis of the Alabama Bar, 27 ALA. LAW. 32, 33 (1966).
37. Id. at 37-38; see TONY FREYER & TIMOTHY DIXON, DEMOCRACY AND JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE: A HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL COURTS OF ALABAMA, 1820-1994, at 188 (1995)
(listing Alabama State Bar membership data).
38. 45th Proceedings, supra note 35, at 117-21.
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the Alabama total, were based in Jefferson County. 39 The Bar in Ala-
bama's second and third largest cities (Mobile and Montgomery, re-
spectively) grew at a more rapid rate, from a combined total of more
than 13% of state lawyers in 1922, to more than 23% in 1965.0 Al-
though the movement toward a predominantly urban Bar was a major
feature of the twentieth century, the numbers and influence of more
rural practitioners remained strong. For example, in his 1965 study,
Payne commented on the "disproportionate concentration" (12%) of
practitioners in "extremely small towns."
41
If small-town and rural practitioners remained strong components of
the Bar, old-fashioned modes of practice likewise prevailed well into
the twentieth century. Solo practitioners consistently made up the larg-
est number of lawyers in Alabama. 42 As late as the mid-1960s, John
Payne reported that, while 904 lawyers were practicing as partners in
firms, 924 were "solos. '43 Lawyering in such an atmosphere was far
removed from practice in the larger cities of the East and Midwest-
where legal economics had encouraged the creation of multi-lawyer
firms, in which managing bodies of partners were served by dozens of
associate lawyers in an atmosphere of high technology and specializa-
tion." Even in the cities, such innovations were slow to take hold in
Alabama.
Indeed, the largest Alabama firms listed in the 1932 Martin-
dale-Hubbell were Bradley, Baldwin, All & White (ten partners and
five associates) and London, Yancey & Brower (seven partners and
three associates). 5 Similarly, the largest firms listed in 1952 were
White, Bradley, Arant, All & Rose (nine partners and eight associates),
Martin, Turner, Blakey & Bouldin (six partners and eight associates),
and Lange, Simpson, Robinson & Somerville (nine partners and three
associates). 46 These firms were all based in Birmingham, and displayed
some big-city traits beyond that of their size and general corporate
39. Payne, supra note 36, at 35 (indicating that in 1965, Jefferson County contained 851 of
2,716 Alabama lawyers). The 1922 count indicated 381 of 1,305 lawyers were in Jefferson
County. 45th Proceedings, supra note 35, at 110-27.
40. 45th Proceedings, supra note 35, at 122-24 (stating that in 1922 Mobile and Montgom-
ery County each had 86 lawyers out of a total of 1,305 in the state); Payne, supra note 36, at 33,
35 (stating that in 1965 Mobile County was home to 319 lawyers and Montgomery County was
home to 311 lawyers out of 2,716 in the state).
41. Payne, supra note 36, at 36-37. He found that 52% of legal professionals were based in
the three large cities, 21% lived in "medium" cities of 20,000 to 99,999 people, 15% were
located in cities of 5,000 to 19,999 people, and 12% in towns of 4,999 or less. Id. at 36.
42. See id. at 39-40.
43. Id. at 39. Payne also noted that 122 lawyers were practicing as associates in firms or
with solo lawyers. Id.
44. MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM 1-19 (1991).
45. MARTINDALE-HUBBELL 1932, supra note 35, pt. 1, at 3, 5.
46. MARTINDALE-HUBBELL 1952, supra note 35, pt. 1, at 6-7, 9.
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practice.47 London, Yancey & Brower, for example, specialized in rep-
resenting insurance companies, while White, Bradley, Arant, All &
Rose tended to represent heavy industry.48 Lange, Simpson, Robinson
& Somerville had a branch office in Montgomery.49 These firms, how-
ever, were not typical. Most Alabama firms had only two or three part-
ners and were geared towards handling the problems of farmers, store-
keepers, and small-scale industrialists.50
Given the racial history of post-Civil War Alabama, it should not be
surprising that the membership of these firms was exclusively white."'
As late as 1932, Martindale-Hubbell listed only two black lawyers in
Alabama, both.practicing in Birmingham." Yet, after the 1937 admis-
sion of Arthur Davis Shores, who made a specialty of civil rights suits,
the number of black practitioners began to grow.5 3 By the 1950s, out-
spoken black attorneys were practicing in several cities including:
Shores in Birmingham, Fred Gray in Montgomery, and J.L. Chestnut,
Jr. in Selma. 4 Chestnut would eventually put together the largest black
law firm in Alabama. 55 Even so, a study published in 1974 concluded
that there were only forty black lawyers practicing in Alabama, less
than 1.7% of the Bar.56
The number of women admitted to the Bar in Alabama likewise
grew slowly from October 1908 when Maud McLure Kelly began her
career as the state's first woman advocate. 57 At that time, most South-
ern states did not allow women to practice; Alabama's law had been
altered in 1907 to extend the diploma privilege to women enrolled at
The University of Alabama School of Law.5" Like their black counter-
47. See MARTINDALE-HUBBELL 1932, supra note 35, pt. 1, at 3, 5; see also MARTINDALE-
HUBBELL 1952, supra note 35, pt. 1, at 21.
48. See MARTINDALE-HUBBELL 1932, supra note 35, pt. 2, at 3, 5.
49. See MARTINDALE-HUBBELL 1952, supra note 35, pt. 1, at 6, 7, 9.
50. Id. at 1-27.
51. See id.
52. MARTINDALE-HUBBELL 1932, supra note 35, pt. 1, at 1-19.
53. See J. CLAY SMITH, JR., EMANCIPATION: THE MAKING OF THE BLACK LAWYER, 1844-
1944, at 274-75 (1993).
54. MARTINDALE-HUBBELL 1952, supra note 35, pt. 1, at 8; JOHN A. SALMOND, THE
CONSCIENCE OF A LAWYER: CLIFFORD J. DURR AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES, 1899-1975, at
171, 172 (1990); J.L. CHESTNUT, JR. & JULIA CASS, BLACK IN SELMA: THE UNCOMMON LIFE
OF J.L. CHESTNUT, JR. 81-143 (1990).
55. CHESTNUT & CASS, supra note 54, at 398-99.
56. Albert E. Drake, Racial Composition of Attorneys and Law Program for the State of
Alabama 3 (June 27, 1974) (unpublished study, The University of Alabama) (on file at the
Bounds Law Library, The University of Alabama School of Law). Note that Drake gives a figure
of 1.06%, a miscalculation. See also Note, Negro Members of the Alabama Bar, 21 ALA. L.
REV. 306 (1969).
57. CYNTHIA NEWMAN, MAUD MCLURE KELLY: ALABAMA'S FIRST WOMAN LAWYER 1
(1984).
58. Id. at 8; Act of Mar. 2, 1907, no. 201, 1907 Ala. Acts 201; see JOHN MCDUFFIE, TO
INQUIRING FRIENDS IF ANY: AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN MCDUFFIE 137-38 (Mary Margaret Flock
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parts, women practitioners congregated initially in cities. Of the twelve
female attorneys identified in the 1932 Martindale-Hubbell, eight prac-
ticed in Birmingham and two in Mobile. 9
Whatever obstacles they faced, it is apparent that women lawyers
gradually spread out around the state. In 1952, of thirty-three women
listed in Martindale-Hubbell, thirteen were practicing in such small
towns as Alexander City, Enterprise, Hurtsboro, and Union Springs.'
More than a decade later, the Payne study identified fifty women, thirty
of whom met the standard of being "full-time practitioners." 6' Half of
the latter were based in Birmingham, Montgomery or Mobile and half
in smaller communities, including seven in towns with populations of
5,000 or less.62 Statistics show that women made up 1.8% of the Bar in
1965, a proportion below the national figure of 2.3%, but approxi-
mately equal to that of black lawyers. 3
With regard to their vital statistics, mid-twentieth century Alabama
lawyers were a middle-aged group. 64 More than 43% of Birmingham
lawyers in 1932 were in their thirties and forties; 17% were in their
fifties.' By 1965, the 30 to 49 age group made up more than 53 % of
the state Bar, while lawyers aged 50 to 59 were another 20% of the
total.6 Given these trends, it is interesting that inexperienced attorneys
were relatively numerous.67 In 1932, more than 27% of the Birmingham
Bar had practiced less than ten years; statewide in 1965, persons with
less than ten years' experience constituted 23% of the Bar.68 However,
a youthful career did not necessarily mean a youthful lawyer. The two
World Wars caused many people to delay getting a legal education and
eras of prolonged prosperity (the 1920s and 1950s) may have influenced
the older novices who sought entry into the profession.69
ed., 1970).
59. MARTINDALE-HUBBELL 1932, supra note 35, pt. 1, at 1-19. It is difficult to identify
women in Martindale-Hubbell because so many lawyers used only initials. Id.
60. MARTINDALE-HUBBELL 1952, supra note 35, pt. 1, at 1-27.
61. Payne, supra note 36, at 44.
62. Id. at 45.
63. Id. at 33, 44; Judge Frank C. Hammond, Census Shows Growth in Lawyer Population,
23 ALA. LAW. 83, 83-84 (1962); Drake, supra note 56, at 3.
64. See MARTINDALE-HUBBELL 1932, supra note 35, pt. 1, at 1-19.
65. Id. at 2-8. These figures are based on a count of 476 attorneys listed in the 1932 Martin-
dale-Hubbell. Id. In all, information provided by 207 lawyers identified them as being in their
thirties or forties, and 81 identified themselves as being in their fifties. Id.
66. Payne, supra note 36, at 33-34. Payne lists 1,464 lawyers in their thirties and forties,
and 542 in their fifties, out of a total of 2,716. Id. at 34.
67. See MARTINDALE-HUBBELL 1932, supra note 35, pt. 1, at 1-19.
68. See sources cited supra note 18. In Birmingham in 1932, 130 lawyers (out of 476) listed
themselves as having practiced less than ten years. MARTINDALE-HUBBELL 1932, supra note 35,
pt. 1, at 1-19. In Payne's Statistical Analysis of the Alabama Bar, 626 (out of 2,716) had prac-
ticed less than ten years. Payne, supra note 36, at 34.
69. See Payne, supra note 36, at 34.
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One factor which marked the Bar as a prestigious group in Alabama
was the extent to which lawyers were both college-educated and trained
for practice in an academic setting. By 1932, 75% of lawyers associ-
ated with firms which advertised in Martindale-Hubbell had been to
college, and 85% had been to law school. 70 Two decades later, the re-
spective figures among lawyers listed in Martindale-Hubbell (a much
larger group) were 79.4% and 81.8 %.7' These numbers reflect the rise
and dominance of university-based legal education in America, but in
particular that of The University of Alabama School of Law.'
In the 1920s, under the leadership of Albert J. Farrah (Dean, 1913-
1944), the School of Law had won accreditation by the American Bar
Association and membership in the American Association of Law
Schools; during the same years, the curriculum was expanded to three
years of study.73 Through the 1950s, it offered the only standardized
and comprehensive legal education in the state.74 Since the 1870s,
graduates of the law school had enjoyed the diploma privilege-the
right to practice law without taking a Bar examination.75 Following the
Second World War, a flood of new law students came to Tuscaloosa to
study with the financial assistance of the G.I. Bill.76
It is scarcely surprising, that John Payne was able to report in 1966
that "almost exactly two-thirds of Alabama's lawyers come from the
University Law School. "'n Of course, all of these graduates were white,
since the University of Alabama (like all educational facilities in Ala-
bama) was racially segregated. Indeed, the Legislature in 1945 author-
ized the State Board of Education to provide assistance to black stu-
dents seeking professional education, which was "not available" to
them in Alabama.78 Since the state maintained no black law school, this
70. Educational information is not available in the general state listings of the 1932 Martin-
dale-Hubbell. However, in the "Biographical Section," 35 firms placed advertisements; educa-
tional information was not available for eleven of the 124 lawyers identified in these advertise-
ments, so the figures cited for 1932 are based on a sample of 113 persons. See MARTINDALE-
HUBBELL 1932, supra note 35, at 1-17.
71. The 1952 general listings for Alabama do provide educational information; the figures
cited for 1952 are based on listings for 2093 lawyers. See MARTINDALE-HUBBELL 1952, supra
note 35, at 1-27.
72. See ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850'S
TO THE 1980's, at 3-10 (1983).
73. Robert H. McKenzie, Farrah 's Future: The First One Hundred Years of the University of
Alabama Law School, 1872-1972, 25 ALA. L. REV. 121, 137, 139-40 (1972).
74. See DAVID J. LANGHUM & HOWARD P. WALTHALL, FROM MAVERICK TO MAINSTREAM:
CUMBERLAND SCHOOL OF LAW, 1847-1997, at xiii, 196-97 (1997) (documenting the Cumberland
Law School's move to Alabama in 1961).
75. Paul M. Pruitt, Jr., The Life and Times of Legal Education in Alabama, 1819-1897. Bar
Admissions, Law Schools and the Profession, 49 ALA. L. REV. 281, 300 (1997).
76. McKenzie, supra note 73, at 144.
77. Payne, supra note 36, at 35.
78. ALA. CODE § 52-40(1) (1958).
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meant that black attorneys were necessarily educated out-of-state, and
were to that extent further isolated from their white counterparts.
Despite the impressive state of its general training, the Alabama Bar
displayed an air of provincialism. This was reflected in the fact that a
considerable majority of the Bar was content to practice only in state
courts, despite the fact that during and after the New Deal, issues of
commerce, labor, and civil rights law were increasingly federalized.79
Notably, the number of attorneys admitted to practice between 1930
and 1940 before the state's busiest federal courts, those of the Northern
District, grew from only 88 to 155.80 Each of those figures was less
than 10% of the respective populations of state lawyers. Eventually, the
Alabama Bar responded to the expanding role of federal courts; by
1960 approximately one-third of state lawyers were members of the
Northern District Bar.8' Until that time, federal practice had been
dominated by urban lawyers imbued with the "culture" of federal
courts.82 Thus, these lawyers were somewhat detached from the world
of the typical Alabama practitioner.
Anecdotal evidence of provincialism can be found in reminiscences
and stories written by twentieth-century Alabama practitioners. Francis
Hare's My Learned Friends: Memories of a Trial Lawyer is devoted
partly to tracing the increasing dignity of plaintiff's attorneys. 3 Yet, he
also describes men who "never saw the inside of a college, but they
could make noises like lawyers, and they were neither hindered nor
handicapped by any strict rules. ,84 By way of illustration, Hare tells of
a lawyer, his partner in one case, who resorted to the bizarre maneuver
of objecting in open court to Hare's arguments. They lost the case, and
the man later explained that he had been trying (under his interpretation
of Alabama's complex and outdated rules of procedure) to ensure that
their side had an appealable issue.85
Grover McLeod's Sketches from the Bar is a collection of gritty sto-
ries that their author describes as "caricatures," yet which bear the im-
79. See FREYER & DIXON, supra note 37, at 124-32. Another measure of provincialism was
the low rate of membership of Alabama lawyers in the American Bar Association. Among the
lawyers identified in the "Biographical Section" in the 1932 Martindale-Hubbell, 113 provided
substantial professional information; of these, 45, or 39.7%, were ABA members. See
MARTINDALE-HUBBELL 1932, supra note 35, at 1-17. Of 2,093 lawyers listed in the 1952 Mar-
tindale-Hubbell, only 416, or 19.9% were ABA members. See MARTINDALE-HUBBELL 1952,
supra note 35, at 1-27.
80. FREYER & DIXON, supra note 37, at 129.
81. See id. at 186-89.
82. Id.
83. FRANCIS HUTCHESON HARE, MY LEARNED FRIENDS: MEMORIES OF A TRIAL LAWYER 3-
25 (1976).
84. HARE, supra note 83, at 31.
85. Id. at 31-32.
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press of his many years' practice in Alabama courts.16 Most of the at-
torneys he describes are small-time practitioners who are not concerned
with justice, grand principles, or even clever pleading, but rather with
the study of human nature in the hope of winning larger fees. 7
"[M]oney is the secret to this business, eh men?" says one of his char-
acters, addressing a smiling assembly of the profession. 8  The only
lawyer of scholarly disposition presented by McLeod is the pompous
chairman of "one of those numerous paper committees of the Bar,
which someone had foolishly given the title, 'Committee to make all
Uniform Codes Uniform! '89
Of course, the storytelling of Hare and McLeod does not encompass
the full story of lawyers in their time, any more than Joseph Glover
Baldwin's The Flush Times of Alabama and Mississippi is a
well-rounded history of the antebellum legal profession.' Many twenti-
eth century Alabama lawyers rose well above, sometimes magnificently
above, the level of provincialism. In the early 1920s, Borden Burr
worked mightily within the State Bar Association to modernize the ad-
mission and discipline of the Bar. His younger contemporary, Douglas
Arant, served in 1941 as chairman of an American Bar Association
committee on the Bill of Rights, displaying a sympathetic interest in
legal problems that the Jehovah's Witness denomination was then ex-
periencing in Alabama. 9'
Burr and Arant were corporate lawyers in Birmingham. Hugo Black
had also been a Birmingham plaintiffs' attorney before winning election
to the U.S. Senate in 1926; however, he would spend much of the rest
of his life in Washington, D.C. serving successively as a leading New
Deal senator and supreme court justice.' Clifford J. Durr followed a
different trajectory. After leaving a successful practice in Birmingham
to work with the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the Federal
Communications Commission, he returned in 1951 to a general practice
in Montgomery.93 In 1955, he was the first lawyer to represent Rosa
Parks; indeed, he and his wife Virginia were among the few local
whites known to be sympathetic to the Montgomery Bus Boycott.
94
Burr, Arant and Durr had left the state for their legal educations. 95
86. GROVER S. MCLEOD, Introduction to SKETCHES FROM THE BAR (1966).
87. See id. at 18.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 36.
90. JOSEPH GLOVER BALDWIN, THE FLUSH TIMES OF ALABAMA AND MISSISSIPPI (1853).
91. MERLIN OWEN NEWTON, ARMED WITH THE CONSTITUTION: JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES IN
ALABAMA AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT, 1939-1946, at 85, 164 n.47 (1995).
92. SALMOND, supra note 54, at 37-45, 69-97, 145-54.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 33-143, 154-95.
95. See THOMAS MCADORY OWEN, HISTORY OF ALABAMA AND DICTIONARY OF ALABAMA
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But, Black was a product of The University of Alabama School of Law,
as was the great civil rights jurist Frank M. Johnson.' Richard Rives,
another highly regarded federal judge, had read law in the Montgomery
firm of Hill, Hill, Whiting and Stern, known for its advocacy on behalf
of poor people, white or black.97 Most of these men came from pros-
perous middle-class families; Arant, raised in poverty, was an excep-
tion. It is hard to explain their broader cultural and intellectual hori-
zons, except to point to breadth of experience (Black and Durr), family
or work-related influences (Rives and Johnson), or simply to a personal
receptivity to the values embodied in the U.S. Constitution. These men,
and others like them, were a minority within the Bench and Bar. Too
often, their role was that of prophet without honor. In the early 1920s,
the leaders of the Alabama State Bar Association, many of them corpo-
rate lawyers from Birmingham and other cities, were preoccupied with
the difficulty of imposing standards of ethics and decorum among law-
yers. Many of them were convinced that they were on the verge of a
long-awaited triumph. Yet, their predecessors had felt much the same
way thirty-five years before, when the State Bar Association had voted
to endorse Thomas Goode Jones' Code of Ethics, an eloquent document
that commanded lawyers to deal honestly and courteously with each
other, to seek no advantages with judges, to defend the poor and friend-
less, and above all to refrain from encouraging litigation. 98 Jones' work
was so consistent with the self-image of elite lawyers that it was later
substantially adopted by the American Bar Association.'
The problem with the Jones Code was that it lacked statutory au-
thority.'" This fact was impressed upon leaders of the Birmingham cor-
porate Bar in 1891 when they failed to disbar plaintiffs' attorney Peyton
G. Bowman for hiring "runners" to drum up business.' 1 The Bowman
case revealed that some members of the State Bar Association were
BIOGRAPHY 267 (1921); see MARTINDALE-HUBBELL 1932, supra note 35, at 3-4; see SALMOND,
supra note 54, at 19-32.
96. FREYER & DIXON, supra note 37, at 274; NEWMAN, supra note 33, at 17-20.
97. FREYER & DIXON, supra note 37, at 227.
98. Code of Ethics Adopted by the Alabama State Bar Association, Proceedings of the Tenth
Annual Meeting of the Alabama State Bar Association, 10 ALA. ST. B. ASS'N iv-vi, viii-ix, x-xi,
xiii, xv, xvi (1887) [hereinafter 10th Proceedings]; Allison Marston, Guiding the Profession: The
1887 Code of Ethics of the Alabama State Bar Association, 49 ALA. L. REV. 471, 471-73 (1998).
99. Marston, supra note 98, at 503-07.
100. See Act of Sept. 22, 1885, No. 30, 1885 Ala. Acts 94 (giving the Alabama State Bar
Ass'n the power to bring disbarment proceedings). However, the statutory regulations governing
"the duty of attorneys" had been set forth in the Code of Alabama, Sections 738 through 746, as
were the rules and procedures for disbarment. ALA. CODE §§ 747-762 (1852). These laws, which
were repeated in every code down to that of 1940, provided a framework of legal ethics similar
to the one later put forward by Jones albeit less developed. See James Thomas Norton, A Survey
of Disbarment in Alabama, 18 ALA. LAW. 391, 394-95 (1957).
101. See Proceedings of the Twelfth Annual Meeting of the Alabama State Bar Association, 12
ALA. ST. B. ASS'N 12-17 (1889) [hereinafter 12th Proceedings].
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deeply ambivalent about the enforcement of ethical standards; several
lawyers chose resignation rather than assisting in the prosecution."
The division of the urban Bar into plaintiff and corporate mentalities
was evident in the 1912 report of the Garber Committee, commissioned
by the State Bar Association to study the state of ethical standards in
Jefferson County. Headed by former attorney general Alexander Gar-
ber, this group uncovered a complex world of runners and ambu-
lance-chasers. Yet the committee concluded that such activities were
offset by the work of claims agents, company physicians and jury selec-
tion specialists employed by corporations and their attorneys.1
3
While it was difficult for State Bar Association members to agree
on matters of professional propriety, many of them shared a desire to
expand the size and influence of their organization. From its origins,
the State Bar Association had aspired to speak for the Bar. Yet its
membership had never been large; as late as the early 1920s, Associa-
tion lawyers made up less than one-fourth of Alabama's lawyers.1  Its
1921 state convention debated schemes involving automatic membership
for University of Alabama graduates and participation by members of
local Bar associations. 5 At the same time, a number of members were
showing interest in a plan of absolute expansion and centralized disci-
pline that had originated in states of the West and Midwest: the "inte-
grated Bar," by which all lawyers were required by statute to belong to
a single organization."0
From the standpoint of elite lawyers, a self-regulated Bar was a
perfect mechanism for controlling both admissions and disbarments.
102. See id.; Ex parte State Bar Association, 92 Ala. 113, 114 (1890); see generally
BIRMINGHAM DAILY NEWS, Jan. 17, 30, Feb. 3, Mar. 14, 23, 30, 31, Apr. 1, 1891 (including
articles on the Birmingham Bar Association, whose leaders had been prominent in seeking Bow-
man's disbarment).
103. Proceedings of the Thirty-Fourth Annual Meeting of the Alabama State Bar Association,
34 ALA. ST. B. ASS'N 95-97 (1911) [hereinafter 34th Proceedings]; See generally WILLIAM G.
THOMAS, LAWYERING FOR THE RAILROAD BUSINESS, LAW, AND POWER IN THE NEW SOUTH 33-
60 (1999) (addressing the treatment of the division of the New South bar into corporate and
plaintiffs' contingents).
104. See Proceedings: First Meeting of the Alabama State Bar and of the Forty-Seventh An-
nual Meeting of the Alabama State Bar Association, 47 ALA. ST. B. ASS'N 69-77 (1924) [herein-
after 47th Proceedings]. Not counting honorary or deceased members, there were 280; 21.5% of
the 1,300. Id.
105. Proceedings of the Forty-Fourth Annual Meeting of the Alabama State Bar Association,
44 ALA. ST. B. ASS'N 6-14, 16-21 (1921) [hereinafter 44th Proceedings].
106. Id. at 42-49; 47th Proceedings, supra note 104, at 137 (recognizing that, after North
Dakota and Idaho, Alabama was the third state to adopt such a bar statute); See generally JAMES
WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 292-93 (1950). Note the
comparison in Proceedings of the Forty-Sixth Annual Meeting of the Alabama State Bar Associa-
tion, of law to medicine and other professions in Alabama. Proceedings of the Forty-Sixth Annual
Meeting of the Alabama State Bar Association, 46 ALA. ST. B. ASS'N 252 (1923) [hereinafter
46th Proceedings]. For years Alabama physicians had been self-regulating through a Board of
Medical Examiners. ALA. CODE §§ 1626-1646 (1907).
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The latter aspect was particularly attractive to the corporate Bar, for
disbarment actions under then-current law were tried in Circuit Court,
where they were treated as quasi-criminal and where plaintiffs' attor-
neys enjoyed many procedural advantages. 7 In 1922, after much pre-
liminary discussion, Birmingham corporate lawyer Borden Burr pushed
successfully for creation of a Bar Association committee instructed to
draft an integrated Bar bill; his goal was to lobby both the 1922 state
Democratic convention and the Legislature for such an act. 08
That summer, Burr and his committee wrote their bill, the chief
feature of which was the creation of a powerful Bar commission, a gov-
erning body elected by attorneys, to consist of one member from each
judicial circuit."° Endorsed by the Democratic Party and passed by the
Senate, the measure stalled in the House through the opposition of law-
yer-legislators who saw in the commission the potential for arbitrary
and even partisan action."0 At an April 1923 meeting of the Bar Asso-
ciation, Burr and his allies made concessions to their critics and pre-
pared to return to the fray. Their second effort was successful because,
in August of 1923, the Legislature passed a version of Burr's Bar
integration act.'
Under the new legislation, the Bar commissioners were vested with
power to regulate admissions, to establish rules of professional ethics,
and to try disbarment cases." 2 However, they were constrained to up-
hold existing statutory law concerning admissions qualifications, and
their rulemaking and removal powers were subject to review by the
Alabama Supreme Court."' Plaintiffs' attorneys had succeeded thus far
in watering down centralized control, but they had not been able to pre-
serve the right to a jury trial for respondents in disciplinary actions.
Throughout the campaign for an integrated Bar, Burr and his allies had
maintained that disbarment was not a quasi-criminal process, but an
inherent right of courts." 4
In coming years it would be clear that the 1923 law had created new
levers of potential power without greatly diminishing those belonging to
the old State Bar Association. Surely the state-wide organization of the
107. Norton, supra note 100, at 397; 45th Proceedings, supra note 35, at 52-70; 46th Pro-
ceedings, supra note 106, at 51-57.
108. 45th Proceedings, supra note 35, at 56-70, 17-18, 19-38; 44th Proceedings, supra note
105, at 44.
109. See 46th Proceedings, supra note 1076, at 254-55.
110. Id. at 56-57.
111. 46th Proceedings, supra note 1076, at 246-54; 47th Proceedings, supra note 104, at 24-
26. It is worth noting that Burr held a public meeting in Birmingham in July 1922. 46th Proceed-
ings, supra note 106, at 246.
112. Act of Aug. 9, 1923, No. 133, 1923 Ala. Acts 100, 102-03.
113. Id.
114. See id. at 102-06; 46th Proceedings, supra note 1076, at 250-52.
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Bar was potentially a democratic innovation. Yet by 1927, the Alabama
State Bar Association had secured laws grafting its name upon the inte-
grated Bar and allowifig for election of state Bar presidents by the dele-
gates to its annual convention." 5 The laws further provided that the
state Bar president should also be president of the Board of Commis-
sioners."16 In short, while the mass of lawyers could elect the men who
were to exercise control over admission and discipline, the veteran
convention-goers of the old organization retained an influential voice.' 
17
Urban corporate practitioners were the most influential group
within the Alabama Bar Association; yet they were slow to achieve
their disciplinary goals within the State Bar Commission. The Commis-
sioners authorized local grievance committees to bring charges against
erring lawyers; but the Commission itself, with one member from each
judicial circuit, was scarcely a mirror of the urban Bar." 8 Indeed, more
than a third of early Commissioners lived in villages or very small
towns, and, evidently less than half of them were members of firms." 9
115. Act of June 6, 1931, No. 241, 1931 Ala. Acts 284, 285.
116. Act of Aug. 9, 1923, No. 133, 1923 Ala. Acts 100, 102; 47th Proceedings, supra note
104, at 40-47. An organization styled the Alabama State Bar had come into being under authority
of the Bar Commissioners in 1924. Id. Initially it was under the name of the Alabama State Bar,
it had almost immediately merged with the Alabama State Bar Association. Id.
117. In 1931, for example, with the backing of Bar Association members, the legislature
removed the limitations previously placed on the Bar Commission concerning educational qualifi-
cations for admission. ALA. CODE § 6225 (1928 & Supp. 1936).
118. See Act of Aug. 9, 1923, No. 133, 1923 Ala. Acts 100; ALA. CODE §§ 6223, 6225
(1928 & Supp. 1936) (showing grievance committees); see also Proceedings of the Alabama
State Bar Association: Fifty-Fourth Annual Meeting, 51 ALA. ST. B. ASS'N 17-18, 42 (1931)
[hereinafter 54th Proceedings].
119. These statements are based on studies of members of the Board of Commissioners in
1927 and 1931. ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF ARCHIVES AND HISTORY, ALABAMA OFFICIAL AND
STATISTICAL REGISTER 30 (1927) (listing membership information); ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF
ARCHIVES AND HISTORY, ALABAMA OFFICIAL AND STATISTICAL REGISTER 46 (1931); see
MARTINDALE'S AMERICAN LAW DIRECTORY, pt. 1 at 2, 5, 7-13, 15, 17, 18 (1927) [hereinafter
MARTINDALE'S 1927] (listing practice information on the Commissioners); MARTINDALE'S
AMERICAN LAW DIRECTORY, pt. 1, at 2, 5, 10-14, 16, 18-21 (1930) [hereinafter MARTINDALE'S
1930] (listing practice information on the Commissioners). Like other directories of its kind,
Martindale's is organized by town and the population of each town is given at the head of its
entry. See MARTINDALE-HUBBELL 1932, supra note 35, at 1-19. A survey of the 1927 Commis-
sion revealed that, of 21 members, 4 lived in towns having a population of 1,000 or less; 5 in
towns whose population was 1,001 to 2,000; 6 in towns whose population was 2,001 to 10,000;
three in towns whose population was 10,001 to 25,000; and one each in Birmingham, Montgom-
ery, and Mobile. 1 The MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY, pt. 1, 1-19 (60th ed. 1927)
[hereinafter MARTINDALE-HUBBELL 1927]. The 1927 Martindale-Hubbell listings for these
Commissioners indicated that only seven of them were connected with firms. Id. at 1-19. A
survey of the 1931 Commission revealed that of 23 members, 3 lived in towns having a popula-
tion of 1,000 or less; 5 in towns whose population was 1,001 to 2,000; 6 in towns whose popula-
tion was 2,001 to 10,000; 6 in towns whose population was 10,001 to 25,000; and one each in
Birmingham, Montgomery, and Mobile. MARTINDALE-HUBBELL 1932, supra note 35, at 1-19.
The 1930 Martindale-Hubbell listings for these Commissioners indicated that eleven of them
were connected with firms. Few of the Commissioners in either year listed corporate clients in
their advertisements. 1 The MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY, pt. 1, at 1-21 (62d ed.
1930) [hereinafter MARTINDALE-HUBBELL 1930].
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Since the 1923 act required a two-thirds majority vote for suspension or
disbarment, it is no surprise that corporate practitioners did not always
have their way. Perhaps the best proof of their frustration was the fact
that in 1931 they changed the rules, securing passage of an act which
provided that a simple majority of Commissioners present could remove
a lawyer from practice.12
Yet the enforcement of legal ethics remained a difficult task, in part
because lawyers remained divided over the precise limits of ethical be-
havior. It was not until 1940 that the Bar Commission exercised its
right to promulgate rules of conduct for the profession issuing a collec-
tion of "Amended Rules" which began with a summary of the Jones
Code. 12' At the heart of the new document was a series of rules (20
through 23) aimed directly at the old problem of ambulance-chasing and
agents, which forbade an attorney to "[s]olicit his employment or pro-
fessional engagement," "[e]mploy any person to seek for . . . or pro-
cure a client or professional business," or "[p]romise to give . . . any
valuable consideration to any person" who might place "in the hands..
a claim or demand or an item of business of any kind."122
At no point during the mid-twentieth century was there a purge of
the plaintiffs' Bar, nor even a prolonged increase in disciplinary ac-
tions. " It may be that the task of investigating misconduct in a growing
legal profession was simply more than the Commissioners were able or
willing to perform. 124 Or it may be that the development of workmen's
compensation law in the state, followed by the rise in the 1950s of a
professionally dignified Alabama Plaintiffs' Lawyers Association,
dulled the edge of competition between the corporate and plaintiffs'
Bars."2 Whatever the case, it seems clear that the Bar Commission's
120. Act of June 6, 1931, No. 241, 1931 Ala. Acts 284, 286; see also ALA. CODE § 6225
(1928 & Supp. 1936); Proceedings of the Fifty-Third Annual Meeting of the Alabama State Bar
Association, 53 ALA. ST. B. ASS'N 36-48 (1930) [hereinafter 53d Proceedings].
121. AMENDED RULES GOVERNING THE CONDUCT OF ATTORNEYS IN ALABAMA, 239 Ala.
xxiii (1940).
122. Id. at xxiv (citing rules 20-23). Rule 32 is similarly aimed at corporate defense attorneys
who might deal with firms "in the business of investigating or adjusting" claims for "personal
injuries or wrongful death." Id. at xxv.
123. 53d Proceedings, supra note 120, at 30-32. Immediately after passage of the 1923 act,
the Bar Commission "disbarred three or four lawyers, [and] tried two or three more"; yet after-
wards disbarment trials and even charges tapered off. Id at 30; see Board of Commissioners
Meet., 8 ALA. LAW. 209 (1947) (demonstrating a fairly relaxed atmosphere toward disbarment in
a Bar Commission meeting at which there were two appeals for reinstatement (one granted) and
one set of charges considered which resulted in a 90-day suspension); see also Lawrence F.
Gerald, Bar Commission Activities, 11 ALA. LAW. 48 (1950) (demonstrating a lack of discipli-
nary business).
124. 53d Proceedings, supra note 120, at 36.
125. See ALA. CODE §§ 26-253 to 329 (1940); see also ALBERT B. MOORE, HISTORY OF
ALABAMA 813 (1951) (stating that the reform of workman's compensation laws in Alabama dates
from a statute of 1919 which standardized the compensation for various injuries and "and al-
lowed employers to insure themselves against their risks"); see also House Joint Resolution of
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disciplinary power served chiefly as a check against outrageous behav-
ior, to be applied when the evidence, or the consensus of local attor-
neys, was overwhelming.
Such was the case when two Shelby County lawyers were disbarred
in 1953 after a parade of witnesses had testified to their solicitation of
business.' 26 Similar factors on a larger scale influenced the Bar Com-
mission's response to a later "quickie divorce" scandal. A trifling
change of statutory law in 1945 had opened the way for courts of equity
jurisdiction to grant discreet, speedy divorces to residents of other
states. Word spread among Alabama (and New York) lawyers, and
within a few years business was booming in the courts whose judges
were willing to countenance such proceedings. Many of the latter pre-
sided over inferior courts in rural counties; one such tribunal in Geneva
County granted about 5,800 divorces in two years.' 27
The divorce situation was discussed as a nuisance detrimental to the
profession and the state's reputation as early as 1957.128 Yet it was not
until 1961 that the Bar Commission changed the rules of professional
conduct to forbid lawyers to act in a divorce case in which there was
"knowledge or reasonable cause to believe that neither party" was a
"bona fide resident." 2 9 Over the next three years, the Bar Commis-
sion's Grievance Committee investigated the divorce business in vari-
ous counties. In Geneva County it secured the suspension of one judge
and one attorney through what amounted to a plea bargain, and dis-
barred two attorneys after formal proceedings; in the process it over-
came a lawsuit filed to keep it from examining a cache of secret re-
cords. 30
These events may show the real (if slow-acting) power of the Bar
Commission; they also show the continuing difficulty of uniting Ala-
bama lawyers around any pattern of professional decorum. Such in fact
were the weaknesses which plagued the organized Bar beyond the first
six decades of the twentieth century. It was a small wonder that lawyers
September 25, 1915, No. 828, 1915 Ala. Acts 944-45 (demonstrating legislation that created a
commission to reform the workman's compensation law).
126. See In the Matter of T.K. Selman, Special Publication (Bd. of Commissioners of Ala.
State Bar 1953); see generally Oscar L. Tompkins, Impeachment and Removal of Three Circuit
Judges, 21 ALA. LAW. 211 (1960) (reviewing analogous proceedings regarding judges).
127. D.L. Rosenau, Jr., Those "Quickie" Alabama Divorces, 18 ALA. LAW. 37 (1957);
Robert E. Steiner, III, Complaints Against Lawyers and Their Handling, 25 ALA. LAW. 373, 378
(1964).
128. See, e.g., Rosenau, supra note 127; see also J.H. Perdue, Unprofessional Solicitation of
Employment, 21 ALA. LAW. 106 (1960).
129. ALABAMA SUPREME COURT: RULES GOVERNING THE CONDUCT OF ATTORNEYS,
AMENDMENT TO RULE 25, 272 Ala. xxii (1961).
130. Robert A. Martin, It Was About Power and Judicial Independence, 60 ALA. LAW. 196
(1999) (stating that, in all, "[o]ver 20 judges and lawyers were disbarred or suspended.");
Steiner, supra note 127, at 373-80.
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were unable to formulate a coordinated response to the Civil Rights
movement, much less serve as interpreters and mediators of the changes
sweeping over the state!
II. LEGISLATIVE CONTROL, JUDICIAL DECENTRALIZATION, AND
THE SUPREME COURT'S INACTION
Reform legislation in 1915 consolidated nisi prius courts in Ala-
bama and abolished free-standing chancery courts as well as a patch-
work of city and county courts. The product of this revolution was a
network of circuit courts presided over by the Chief Justice of the Su-
preme Court of Alabama. The latter was invested with power to alter
the schedules and assignments of courts and judges so as to avoid the
evils of unequal case loads and overburdened dockets. 1 ' Appellate jus-
tice was administered by a three-judge court of appeals, which because
it was limited to cases worth $1,000 or less was, in effect, a criminal
appeals court, and the seven-member supreme court.'32 The supreme
court was given conditional power to establish rules of procedure for
the lower courts.'33 The hope in 1915 was that the Bench might, to
some degree, escape from the legislative domination under which it had
struggled since the adoption of the Code of 1852.114
Predictably, the circuit court system grew with the population from
nineteen circuits in 1917 to thirty-seven in 1970.135 Litigation flourished
most in urban areas, as had been the case since after the Civil War. For
instance, over the two-year period from 1936 to 1938, Alabama Circuit
Courts disposed of more than 16,000 criminal cases, of which more
than 2,800 were tried or processed in Jefferson County. 136 Two decades
later, the combined Circuit Courts saw more than 13,900 criminal ac-
tions filed and more than 7,500 cases decided in just the first six
months of 1960; the corresponding figures for Jefferson County were
3,361 filings and 2,048 cases decided.
137
131. Act of Aug. 16, 1915, No. 217, 1915 Ala. Acts 279-280; Act of Sept. 18, 1915, No.
521, 1915 Ala. Acts 592-594; Act of Sept. 25, 1915, No. 712, 1915 Ala. Acts 809-814; see also
1915 Ala. Acts LV-LIX, LX-LXXIII.
132. ALA. CODE §§ 7308-09, 10269 (1923).
133. Act of Sept. 17, 1915, No. 537,1915 Ala. Acts 607 (codified as amended at ALA. CODE
§ 3227 (1907)) (effective Sept. 17, 1915).
134. See Proceedings of the Thirty-Seventh Annual Meeting of the Alabama State Bar Associa-
tion, 37 ALA. ST. B. Ass'N 43-50, 88-92 (1914) [hereinafter 37th Proceedings].
135. Judges of Circuit Courts During the Time the Cases in This Volume Were Tried, 200
Ala. iv (1916-17); Judges of Circuit Courts During the Time the Cases in This Volume Were
Tried, 286 Ala. vi-ix (1969-70).
136. 1936-1938 BIENNIAL REP. OF THE ATT'Y GEN. 804-11, 868-70; see also id. at 879-80
(demonstrating that Marengo County in the Black Belt dealt with 212 cases in the same interval).
137. Chart of Alabama Circuit Courts Criminal Dockets for Jan.-June, 1960, 23 ALA. LAW.
62, 63-65 (1962) (demonstrating that corresponding figures for Marengo County were 128 filings
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Overcrowded dockets had been a problem in urban counties prior to
1915, and consolidation of jurisdictions had not reversed the trend. At
the end of proceedings in the first six months of 1960, twenty-one
counties each had 100 or more cases remaining on their equity dockets;
twenty-four were similarly situated with regard to civil dockets, as
were seventeen with regard to criminal dockets. Jefferson County ex-
perienced by far the worst backlog, with 2,542 equity cases, 6,159 civil
cases, and 1,313 criminal cases left over. But dockets in several other
counties, including Mobile, Montgomery, Etowah, and Calhoun, were
also notably congested. 131 In theory, such imbalances could have been
corrected by the chief justices. In practice the latter used their schedul-
ing powers only when requested by a circuit's chief judge, though by
the mid-1960s such requests were apparently fairly common .
13
Such overcrowding might be taken to reflect a natural phase of a
court system planted in an expanding and urbanizing population. Yet
the growing pains were accompanied by growing discontent among
judges, lawyers, and the public with the state's outmoded procedural
system, which had not been altered substantially since the adoption of
the 1852 Code. That document, though it instructed lawyers to use
plain language in pleadings and provided a number of pleading-forms,
had not replaced the old forms of action with a general "civil action."
As a result, mid-twentieth century litigants were still subject to the de-
lays and subterfuges which marked common law pleading at its
worst. 1
40
Over the years, many reformers had advocated the rationalization of
procedure, perhaps most notably Chief Justice George W. Stone, who
made an important address on the subject before the State Bar Associa-
tion in 1889."4' In fact, power over procedure belonged chiefly to the
legislature, which proved to be an imprecise instrument for such a
technical endeavor. 4 2 Legislators proved reluctant to diminish their
and 127 cases decided; however, it should be noted that the Jefferson County criminal docket
was busier in the first six months of 1960 than in the last months of that year).
138. Id. at 54-55, 58-59, 62-63 (demonstrating that Mobile County's overload consisted of
2,591 equity, 2,407 civil, and 692 criminal cases; Montgomery County's overload consisted of
1,012 civil and 415 criminal cases (Montgomery County did not report equity cases); Etowah
County's overload consisted of 833 equity, 1,175 civil, and 566 criminal cases; Calhoun
County's overload consisted of 501 equity, 725 civil, and 147 criminal cases).
139. ROBERT J. FRYE, THE ALABAMA SUPREME COURT: AN INSTITUTIONAL VIEW 19, 20
(1969). Charles D. Cole, Judicial Reform in Alabama: A Reflection, 60 ALA. LAW. 185, 186
(1999) (blaming this condition on the low level of staffing afforded to chief justices).
140. ALA. CODE §§ 1-2227, 1-2236 (1852); Thomas E. Skinner, Stagnation or Moderniza-
tion: Alabama's Procedural Crisis, 32 ALA. LAW. 128, 139 (1971).
141. Skinner, supra note 140, at 130-31 (citing 12th Proceedings, supra note 101, at 108,
113-14).
142. Legislative intent was not necessarily reactionary. Skinner, supra note 140, at 138-39
(discussing an effort by lawmakers to change common law rules to allow a "principal or master
to be sued jointly with his servant"). The initial act was passed in 1947 but the rule, challenged
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power over the courts; even the 1915 grant of rule-making power to the
supreme court placed judge-made rules below statute law. 143 It should
be noted, though, that the state's procedural reformers were not alone
in their frustration. The American Bar Association had advocated a
uniform code of judicial procedure as early as 1912, but for more than
twenty years would enjoy little success in promoting it.'
44
In 1938, the United States Supreme Court adopted and promulgated
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which were designed to simplify
and streamline pleadings. According to one authority, the impact of the
F.R.C.P. was to provide "knowledge or disclosure to all with no bonus
for tricks of concealment." 45 These regulations were powerfully ap-
pealing to Bench and Bar across the nation and, by the mid-1950s,
more than twenty states had adopted them in whole or part. 46 In Ala-
bama, the Federal Rules excited considerable interest among leaders of
the State Bar Association, whose presidents twice commended the
F.R.C.P. in addresses to the annual convention. 147 More to the point,
procedural reformers spent years in behind-the-scenes discussion; fi-
nally in 1955 the Legislature created a Commission for Judicial Re-
form. 48 Chaired by Thomas E. Skinner of the Birmingham Bar, the
reform commission numbered among its members Martin Leigh Harri-
son, Dean of The University of Alabama School of Law, various prac-
ticing lawyers and officials of the Bar Association, Attorney General
John Patterson, and several state and federal judges, including Chief
Justice J. Ed Livingston. 149 In addition the commission employed noted
in the courts, was not firmly in place until 1964. Id. The 1955 introduction of discovery princi-
ples demonstrate another progressive (and less prolonged) legislative accomplishment. Id. at 146.
See Act of Sept. 8, 1955, No. 375, 1955 Ala. Acts 901-07; see Thomas E. Skinner, Pre-trial and
Discovery Under the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, 9 ALA. L. REv. 202 (1957). Yet here
the supreme court construed the law so that it did not apply to criminal cases. H.H. Grooms,
Discovery and Evidence Under Act 375, Acts of 1955 and Title 7, Section 474 (1)-(18), Code of
Alabama of 1940, 22 ALA. LAW. 42 (1961).
143. Act of Sept. 17, 1915, No. 537, 1915 Ala. Acts 607 (codified as amended at ALA. CODE
§ 3227 (1907)) (effective Sept. 17, 1915); Skinner, supra note 140, at 131 (discussing a package
of procedural reforms proposed in the legislation in 1923, of which only one passed).
144. Charles E. Clark, Alabama's Procedural Reform and the National Movement, 9 ALA. L.
REV. 167 (1957).
145. Id. at 170 (discussing the history of the adoption of the F.R.C.P.).
146. Id.
147. Skinner, supra note 140, at 131.
148. Id. at 132; Alice Merchant, The Historical Background of the Procedural Reform Move-
ment in Alabama, 9 ALA. L. REV. 284, 290-93 (1957). Some progress had been made prior to
1955. In 1940 the supreme court, acting upon specific legislative authority, had adopted new
equity rules. Id at 293. In 1951, a joint legislative committee worked with members of the Bar
Association; their most significant conclusion was that the supreme court should begin to exer-
cise its rule-making function. Id.
149. Id. at 294-96 (discussing membership of the Commission for Judicial Reform and the
separate Judiciary Advisory Council, whose members consisted of members of the House and
Senate, including the Speaker of the House and the Lieutenant Governor).
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civil procedure expert Charles Alan Wright as a consultant.' 50
Divided into panels, the group worked for eighteen months and in
May 1957 presented their finished product, an adaptation of the Federal
Rules, to the Legislature.' Without doubt, their work had required a
degree of unanimity and cooperation among legal professionals not seen
since the passage of the Integrated Bar Act in 1923.
Sadly, it was all for nothing. After passing the House, the Alabama
Rules of Civil Procedure were defeated in the Senate, apparently by the
delaying tactics of two senators.152 The integrated Bar had overcome
legislative roadblocks, but Alabama's version of the F.R.C.P. came
before the Legislature at a time when civil rights advances threatened
the state's culture of segregation and racial discrimination. Federal
judges, especially Federal District Judge Frank M. Johnson, were per-
ceived as agents of these sweeping changes, with the result that few
white politicians were willing to wage a prolonged battle for anything
"federal." '153 Rather, as the career of lawyer and former Circuit Judge
George C. Wallace illustrates, the state's officers were gearing up to
mount a last-ditch campaign in which "white supremacy" was both the
object to be achieved and the weapon of choice.' 54
In short, law reform flew in the face of everything provincial and
inward-turning in the minds of the conventional white Southerners.
Moreover, when the crisis of their social system came, most white law-
yers turned inward. Readers of the Alabama Lawyer, the organ of the
State Bar Association, were treated to the jurisprudence of segregation
in diverse forms.155 However, ideological stands have practical conse-
150. Skinner, supra note 140, at 132 n.21.
151. Id. at 132. See John Patterson Papers (on file with the Bounds Law Library, The Univer-
sity of Alabama School of Law) (documenting the work of the Commission for Judicial Reform).
See generally Charles Alan Wright, Modern Pleading and the Alabama Rules, 9 ALA. L. REV.
179 (1957).
152. Skinner, supra note 140, at 132. See 1 JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF ALABAMA 193-94,
373, 716-17 (Reg. Sess. 1957) (tracking the Rules bill (H. 14), indicating a delay of further
consideration by a vote of 23 to 9); see also 1 JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF ALABAMA 846-49
(Reg. Sess. 1957) (showing eighteen bills related to or adding appendices to H. 14 which were
proposed jointly by Senators E.W. Skidmore and Neil Metcalf). See generally Calhoun Bar
Endorses Proposed Rules, 18 ALA. LAW. 221 (1957) (documenting a unanimous vote).
153. See FREYER & DIXON, supra note 37, at 215-55.
154. See generally DAN T. CARTER, THE POLITICS OF RAGE: GEORGE WALLACE, THE
ORIGINS OF THE NEW CONSERVATISM, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS
(1995); BILL JONES, THE WALLACE STORY 19-31 (1966).
155. See R. Carter Pittman, The Federal Invasion of Arkansas in the Light of the Constitution,
19 ALA. LAW. 168 (1958) (demonstrating segregationist and/or states-rights thinking); see also
Charles L. Bloch, We Who Love the Law, 24 ALA. LAW. 58 (1963); James S. Coleman, The Bill
of Rights, 19 ALA. LAW. 186 (1958); Jule W. Felton, An Appeal to Save Our Written Constitu-
tional Form of Government, 21 ALA. LAW. 390 (1960); Robert Tennent Simpson, Forced Inte-
gration in 173 B.C., 21 ALA. LAW. 406 (1960); L.C. Waddington, Legislative Reapportionment
and the Courts, 24 ALA. LAW. 65 (1963). Readers who wish to see the persistence of conserva-
tive Southern thinking in general should browse the Alabama Lawyer for the 1950s and early
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quences. By abandoning law reform for the better part of a decade,
lawyers and judges tied themselves to a system so formal that substan"
tial justice was frequently sacrificed to precision of wording. A multi-
plicity of "counts" and "replications," and the sweeping use of "de-
murrers," fostered delays that could stretch into years. They were
choosing to preserve, as Thomas E. Skinner said of Alabama's equity
practice, a "fertile field for the proliferation of the artifices of medieval
procedure." 1 6 As noted above, power over the circuit courts belonged
to the legislature, while responsibility (under the 1915 statutes) re-
mained with the supreme court. Yet, for several reasons, the latter was
not equipped to carry out its supervisory duties effectively. First, the
high court was understaffed. Under the "recompiled" Code of 1958,
each of the justices was allowed a law clerk and a secretary; in addi-
tion, the court employed an (administrative) clerk, a reporter, a stenog-
rapher, a marshal-librarian, an assistant to the marshal-librarian, and a
servant. 5 7 These officials assisted in the preparation of decisions and
operations of the court itself. Their administrative powers scarcely ex-
tended beyond the supreme court chambers. Certainly it was not their
function to compile statistics on the operation of trial courts. But as the
chairman of the Bar Association's Committee on Jurisprudence and
Law Reform pointed out in 1958, without such information it was im-
possible "to see the picture as a whole."' 58
Viewed in retrospect, that larger picture would have included de-
centralizing features beyond even those which affected the circuit
courts-specifically, the continued existence of local courts of law and
equity and justice of the peace courts. After abolishing local trial courts
in 1915, the Legislature simply could not resist the political benefits of
creating new ones. The result was a briar patch of semi-independent
jurisdictions in which, in the absence of supervision by the Chief Jus-
tice, corruption of the "quickie divorce" type could take root.5 9 Like-
1960s. It is notable that many of the articles cited above were by residents of other states. Robert
T. Simpson, however, was a justice of the Alabama Supreme Court and was addressing Alabama
circuit judges.
156. Skinner, supra note 140, at 140.
157. ALA. CODE §§ 13-10(1), 13-46, 13-49, 13-61, 13-63, 13-74, 13-75, 13-79, 13-84 (Re-
compiled 1958).
158. Fred S. Ball, 1958 Report of Committee on Jurisprudence and Law Reform, 19 ALA.
LAW. 374 (1958). At this point, Marshal-Librarian Richard W. Neal had developed statistical
forms which had been approved by Chief Justice Livingston and which were to be sent out. Id. at
375.
159. Hugh Maddox, The Scope and Applicability of the Proposed Alabama Rules of Civil
Procedure to the Courts of Alabama, 18 ALA. LAW. 216, 217 n.6, 219 nn.6-9 (1957) (listing
some of these courts and arguing that the then-proposed Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure might
not apply to some of them); see also Hugh Maddox, Reflections on the 25th Anniversary of the
Judicial Article, 60 ALA. LAW. 182, 184 n.1 (1999); Pelham J. Merrill, The Facts About Ala-
bama Courts and Judges Today, 28 ALA. LAW. 139, 141 (1967).
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wise, the survival of justice courts in many counties was an invitation
to ignorance on the Bench and to private arrangements with law en-
forcement officers, typically on behalf of small-town "speed traps."'O
Such subordinate tribunals encouraged the provincialism of lawyers
who practiced before them, perpetuating a legal culture in which proce-
dure was to an extent merely a function of traditions sustained by poli-
tics.
Unfortunately the supreme court itself was a part of that culture.
Certainly it was afflicted with survivals and traditions which prevented
the justices from making coherent use of their own procedures. Pre-
dictably, the rickety system of lower courts sent many appeals (espe-
cially of civil cases) their way. The volume of cases was such that each
justice was expected to write forty to fifty decisions per year, almost
double that of his counterparts in most states. 161 Yet the justices were
not able to make effective use of their time, largely because a
turn-of-the-century statute required them to schedule large amounts of
time for hearing oral arguments from each of eight "divisions" of coun-
ties. 162
Of its own accord, the court insisted on adhering to its long-time
practice of assigning cases (without discussion or examination of docu-
ments) by means of a rotation of justices. This method produced
"one-man" decisions in which the final disposition of a case was made
after the opinion was written. Under this system, it was very difficult
for members of the court to engage in productive debates or (in the
long run) for them to develop an evolving consistent body of case law.
These problems were made worse by the fact that the supreme court
had, since 1903, been divided for most working purposes into two sec-
tions, each of which had little knowledge of the other's cases.' 63 It
should not be surprising that few justices wrote dissenting opinions;
dissenting opinions triggered full-court votes, thus slowing down the
system. Nor should it be surprising that the court had to rule on rehear-
ing motions concerning half its cases.164
Faced with administering a complex system in which there was nei-
ther time nor incentive for consideration of the impact of law upon pol-
icy, the justices were naturally inclined to decide cases upon technicali-
ties of procedure. " This reliance upon technicalities could take the
160. Martin, supra note 130, at 196.
161. Merrill, supra note 159, at 143.
162. ALA. CODE §§ 5958-5959 (1907); FRYE, supra note 7, at 12, 42-45, 46-49, 56 n.40.
Note that arguments in cases originating in rural districts often did not take up the time allotted.
163. FRYE, supra note 7, at 37-39, 41, 55-56; see ALA. CODE § 5949 (1907).
164. FRYE, supra note 7, at 58-61.
165. Id. at 18, 69 (estimating that twenty percent of supreme court cases were decided on
points of procedure); see Skinner, supra note 140, at 133 (observing that Alabama courts in
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form of strict adherence to schedules; in 1955 the court rejected the
appeal of a murder conviction because the appellant filed the transcript
one day after the deadline.' 66 Other technical decisions, as Thomas E.
Skinner wrote in a 1971 article, turned upon the court's rule that
"pleadings are, on demurrer, to be construed most strongly against the
pleader."' 67 In practice, adherence to this rule meant the denial of ap-
peals because of the misuse of words such as "aforesaid," or the omis-
sion (in an otherwise clear description of harmful acts) of the word
"negligently." One appeal was rejected because a lawyer used the sin-
gular rather than the plural form of a noun.16
The court likewise insisted upon the letter of its regulations in the
matter of "assignment of errors." An aspect of pleading intended to be
a mere overview of errors alleged to have been committed by the trial
court, the assignment of errors had become a procedural minefield for
appellants' lawyers. The supreme court, for example, required that ar-
guments within briefs must be tied to specific assignments of error, and
waived any assignment of error which was not so argued. In practice,
attorneys could argue "several unrelated assignments of error . . . to-
gether;" but the court, if it determined that one of them lacked merit,
would throw them all Out. 169 Such rules were foundation stones in a
structure which, according to a 1969 study, "in many respects makes a
mockery of the rationale and purpose of appellate review. "170
Alabama Supreme Court justices were in a sense immune to politics
until well after the middle of the century. Of the thirty-nine persons
who served on the court between 1900 and 1969, eighteen (51.4%) first
gained that office through appointment; as late as 1969, only two of
seven sitting justices had first reached the court through election. 171
There was little opposition from the Republican Party, even in the
"Goldwater" sweep of 1964, and Democratic voters apparently were
content to keep judicial incumbents in office."7 The result was a system
general "attach more importance to semantics than substance").
166. FRYE, supra note 7, at 67 (citing Hornbuckle v. State, 105 So. 2d 864 (Ala. 1958)).
167. Skinner, supra note 140, at 133.
168. Highland Ave. & B.R. Co. v. Miller, 24 So. 955 (Ala. 1898); see also Alabama Power
Co. v. King, 190 So. 2d 674 (Ala. 1966); Mathews v. Donald, 66 So. 2d 195 (Ala. 1953); Bir-
mingham Ry., Light & Power Co. v. Weathers, 51 So. 303 (Ala. 1909).
169. FRYE, supra note 7, at 52-54, 67-68. FRYE notes that the assignment of errors was "one
of the most antiquated" of the court's appellate procedures. Id. See generally REVISED R. SUP.
CT. ALA. (Feb. 1, 1955) (showing the court's rules late in the pre-reform era). Rule 9 specifies
the form of appellants' briefs. Id. at 4-5.
170. FRYE, supra note 7, at 63 (discussing changes in the rules of Alabama appellate proce-
dure proposed within the State Bar Association).
171. Id. at 23; but see Merrill, supra note 159, at 144.
172. See FRYE, supra note 7, at 27, 30. The tenure of chief justices was notably long. In the
twentieth century, John C. Anderson held that office from 1914 to 1940, Lucien Gardner
from 1940 to 1951, and James E. Livingston from 1951 to 1970. Id. at 25; see also Merrill,
supra note 159, at 144 (noting that three Alabama Supreme Court justices were candidates for
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that favored judicial careerists and discouraged the injection of policy
issues into judicial races. 73 There were occasional exceptions, such as
the 1952 primary in which Pelham Merrill defeated Lawrence K. An-
drews. 74 This contest was doubly unusual as both men had reputations
as prominent legislators, and Merrill was known to be a supporter of
the quasi-Populist James "Big Jim" Folsom. 75
Certainly, Alabama judicial politics produced a supreme court
whose members were attuned to the mores of the state's legal profes-
sion and of small-town white society. More than half of the twentieth
century justices were graduates of The University of Alabama's School
of Law. 7 6 Nearly half had held judicial posts immediately prior to join-
ing the supreme court.177 Likewise, rural counties, South Alabama, and
the Black Belt were well represented on the court. 7 ' No justices were
chosen from Mobile, Huntsville, or Gadsden, all urban centers; only
two were elected from Jefferson County. 79 It was natural that the
court's personnel should be familiar with the practice of Alabama law
in all its turgid complexity. But it was unfortunate that so many of them
were products, fundamentally, of communities whose lawyers were
likely to be comfortable with the most provincial aspects of Alabama
practice. 0
Since members of the Alabama Supreme Court were rewarded for
staying out of the public eye, it is not surprising that the mid-twentieth
century court was no hotbed of procedural reformism. Chief Justice
Livingston and fellow justices James J. Mayfield and David F. Stakely
involved themselves in the work of the Commission for Judicial Re-
form. '8 Yet not all of the justices were supportive of the proposed
Rules, and when these reforms were defeated, the court seemed content
reelection in 1964 but had no Republican opposition).
173. See FRYE, supra note 7, at 30-31.
174. Id. at 26.
175. Id.; see generally Scrapbooks, Pelham J. Merrill Collection (on file in the Bounds Law
Library, The University of Alabama School of Law) (containing clippings on the Merrill-
Andrews race).
176. FRYE, supra note 7, at 31.
177. Id. at 30.
178. Id. at 32-34.
179. Id. at 34. However, nine (of thirty-five) justices were chosen from Montgomery County
and four from Tuscaloosa County; both were urban centers of the Black Belt. Id. at 33; see also
ROGERS, supra note 1, at 412-13, 577 (discussing the continuing (but soon declining) political
importance of the Black Belt).
180. Note, however, that specially created courts, the ultimate in provincial practice, were as
likely to exist in urban as in rural centers. See Merrill, supra note 159, at 141.
181. Skinner, supra note 140, at 148; BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Aug. 21, 1955, at 2A (photograph
and caption) (on file at Box 2, File 17, Patterson Papers in the Bounds Law Library, The Uni-




to let the matter lie. 182 In 1961, Governor John Patterson (former mem-
ber of the Commission for Judicial reform) pushed through the Legisla-
ture a bill creating a Judicial Conference which was intended to be a
supervisory and reformist body headed by the Chief Justice. As late as
1969, Livingston had not yet called a meeting.'83
However, the greatest challenge faced by the supreme court, and
indeed by the legal profession of the time, had less to do with proce-
dure than with fundamental justice. Under the leadership of the Rever-
end Martin Luther King, Jr. and other courageous men and women, the
black people of Alabama sought for a long decade-from the start of the
Montgomery Bus Boycott in 1955 to the Selma March of 1965-to gain
or regain certain rights.8 4 Leaders of a Civil Rights movement which
was national in scope and backed increasingly by public opinion outside
the South, King and his supporters staged peaceful demonstrations and
marches protesting the denial of equal access to public facilities, the
persistence of segregated education, and other basic inequalities faced
by black citizens."'
In the pursuit of their rights, these black Alabamians knew that they
were unlikely to receive equal treatment in the state courts. As noted
above, black lawyers were few. Black policemen were scarcely to be
found, and black judges were nonexistent. White officials were prod-
ucts of a segregated society in which black people had been presumed,
for a very long time, to occupy a subordinate place; as a result, white
officials simply did not pick black people for jury duty.'86 Moreover,
white judges often did not give black citizens any more due process
than was absolutely necessary. It was not uncommon for indigent black
182. See Letter from Thomas E. Skinner to Members of the Commission for Judicial Reform
and Members of the Judicial Advisory Council (Apr. 16, 1957) (on file at Box 2, File 16, Patter-
son Papers in the Bounds Law Library, The University of Alabama School of Law) (demonstrat-
ing Supreme Court opposition). This letter states that Justice Thomas Lawson "has expressed
some apprehension" concerning the proposed Rules, and describes an unsuccessful effort to set
up a conference with the justices. Id.
183. Act of Sept. 15, 1961, No. 74, 1961 Ala. Acts 1949-51; FRYE, supra note 7, at 21
nn.42, 22. Pelham Merrill was the leading procedural reformer on the court in the early 1960s.
In December 1966, he addressed the Citizens' Conference on the State Courts; his words quoted
below reflect his sense of isolation. Referring to the "divisions" of the court, Merrill said that he
did "not often get the opportunity to present my ideas that are not checked by three other jus-
tices; but I have that opportunity now and don't blame the court for what you hear from me,
because my colleagues have not told me what to say and have not had the opportunity to concur
in what I say." Merrill, supra note 159, at 140.
184. See generally ROGERS, supra note 1.
185. See ROGERS, supra note 1, at 545-65 (summarizing the Civil Rights movement in Ala-
bama); see generally BRANCH, supra note 2; TAYLOR BRANCH, PILLAR OF FIRE: AMERICA IN
THE KING YEARS 1963-1965 (1998) (giving an overview of the Civil Rights movement).
186. See DAN CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH 196-97, 320




defendants to be assigned counsel at the commencement of trial." 7 Such
was the case at the first of the notorious Scottsboro rape trials of the
1930s. 188 Where blacks were accused of crimes against whites, court
officials, though there were honorable exceptions, often took only the
most perfunctory steps to achieve impartial verdicts.' 89
The manner in which the Scottsboro defendants were repeatedly de-
nied justice touched off a national scandal. 19° Yet state officials com-
menced a quieter (and therefore more effective) defense of "White Su-
premacy" in the summer of 1955, when they attempted to put the Na-
tional Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)
out of business. 19' As a strong and well-financed civil rights organiza-
tion, the NAACP had evoked great hostility among white Alabam-
ians."'2 Therefore, to Attorney General John Patterson, there was no
political risk in asking Circuit Judge Walter B. Jones for an injunction
banning NAACP activities on the grounds that the organization had not
registered under the state's corporation laws, and had backed the at-
tempted integration of The University of Alabama by Autherine Lucy
and the Montgomery Bus Boycott.' 93 A prominent figure in state legal
circles, Jones was also a vocal defender of segregation. "9 He issued the
order and even required the NAACP to hand over an array of records
that included membership lists."9 When the NAACP, fearing reprisals,
refused to surrender the lists, Jones held the organization in contempt;
meanwhile his injunction remained in force."
The NAACP sought relief in the Alabama Supreme Court where,
from July through December 1955, it was rebuffed in a series of proce-
dural rulings by which it was told, successively, to rely upon a writ of
certiorari, informed that their filings were not adequate, and finally
informed that it should have been seeking a writ of mandamus all
along. 97 The NAACP next took its case to the United States Supreme
187. See HARE, supra note 83, at 45-47.
188. CARTER, supra note 186, at 22-23.
189. See id. at 22-23. Certainly Circuit Judge James L. Horton, Jr., was one of the honorable
exceptions. He presided in a fair manner over two of the Scottsboro trials, reversing the convic-
tion of one defendant, Haywood Patterson. He was then defeated for reelection in a 1934 pri-
mary. Id. at 192-239, 264-69, 272-73.
190. Id. at 48-50.
191. See MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE
SUPREME COURT, 1936-1961, at 283-300 (1994). Tushnet notes that attorneys general in Arkan-
sas and Louisiana used similar tactics against the NAACP; more particularly, state officials in
Alabama and other states cited statutes originally designed to hamper the activities of the Ku
Klux Klan. Id. at 283-84.
192. See id.
193. Id. at 283.
194. Id.
195. TUSHNET, supra note 191, at 283.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 284.
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Court, where its general counsel, Robert L. Carter, working with Ar-
thur D. Shores and other attorneys, argued both procedural and
"free-expression" issues.198 The Supreme Court responded favorably in
1958 with an opinion which noted the Alabama court's procedural in-
consistencies and backed Carter's contention that revealing members'
names, in this case, would restrict their right of free association.' The
case was returned to Alabama for trial, with the expectation that Judge
Jones would make final rulings on the status of the NAACP.2'
What followed was a remarkable episode of the law's delay. First,
the Alabama Supreme Court effectively defied the United States Su-
preme Court's decision, declaring in February of 1959, that the latter
had been mistaken in accepting that the NAACP had offered to produce
all records except membership lists. 20' The United States Supreme
Court brushed aside this irrelevancy and, in October 1959, denied the
state's petition for a rehearing. 2 By July of the next year the Alabama
Supreme Court, still disagreeing, finally remanded the cause to Judge
Jones; but in the meantime the NAACP, employing Alabama attorneys
Fred Gray and Arthur D. Shores, had asked the federal courts to vacate
Jones' injunction.0 3 Their request traveled from Frank Johnson's
Montgomery courtroom to the United States Supreme Court, which
gave the state a January 1962 deadline to let the NAACP argue its case
against the injunction.'
A few days before the deadline, Judge Jones finally heard argu-
ments and made his ruling which, in effect, denied the NAACP the
right to exist in Alabama.2'5 The NAACP appealed to the Alabama Su-
preme Court, which delayed until February 1963 and then, with its
other means exhausted, fell back upon its old reliable "assignment of
error" rules. 2°6 Under these regulations, the court claimed that the sec-
tions of the NAACP brief devoted to "argument" (discussions of Jones'
alleged errors) each contained at least one claim without merit; there-
fore the whole appeal was void. 0 7 In July 1964 an infuriated United
States Supreme Court declared such reasoning "wholly unacceptable"
and ordered the Alabama Supreme Court to dissolve Jones' permanent
198. Id. at 284-85.
199. Id. at 287.
200. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Tushnet, supra note 190, at 287; see Elliot
E. Slotnick, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama ex. rel.
Patterson, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 572
(Kermit Hall et al. eds., 1992).
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In staging its own version of massive resistance, Alabama's su-
preme court had diminished its credibility. A few years later, a Univer-
sity of Alabama study would state that the court's brief-preparation
rules as well as its "interpretations of these rules are needlessly com-
plex and petty." 2' The furor of the times blinded many white lawyers
and even more white office-holders and politicians to what they knew
perfectly well-that too often Alabama courts were inadequate to con-
duct even routine business.21° To such men, their ability to use various
legal devices to nullify civil rights laws was a victory of sorts, despite
the scorn it brought down upon them.2"
It was strangely appropriate that, in 1960, in the midst of the crisis
of the old order, the world should be introduced to a fictional character
who was the ideal image of an old-school lawyer. The daughter of an
Alabama attorney, Harper Lee had herself studied law at The Univer-
sity of Alabama.2 12 Her Pulitzer-Prize winning novel To Kill a Mock-
ingbird features lawyer Atticus Finch, a man who believed that the le-
gal system must operate fairly and reasonably, with due process for
black and white alike.2 3 Truly, Finch was portrayed as the true inheri-
tor of a glorious common law tradition; but it should be noted that in
the novel he lost case and client alike. 24 Even in his fictional 1930s
setting, Finch seemed a survival from some earlier and more honorable
day. In the real world, by the time To Kill a Mockingbird was pub-
lished, younger men were taking the stage. They would muster the legal
and political skills necessary to bring about changes that the best of the
old guard had worked for, but had failed to attain.
III. THE NEW REFORM MOVEMENT AND HOWELL HEFLIN
The failure of reform during the 1950s reflected the divisions
within the state's legal profession. In 1955, the Legislature established
the Commission for Judicial Reform and it produced the most compre-
208. NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 296 (1964) vacated, remanded by NAACP v. State,
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NAACP, 109 So. 2d 138 (Ala. 1959) rev'd NAACP v. Alabama, 360 U.S. 240 (1959); see
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hensive study of Alabama court procedure in over a century.2 5 The
Commission recommended that the Legislature adopt a set of rules dif-
fering little from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 26 In 1957, the
House of Representatives passed the proposal, but they were never al-
lowed to come to a vote in the Senate. 2 '7 A few senators were able to
block the measure 218 by appealing to anger against the federal defense
of civil rights. Those favoring reform nonetheless perceived that the
opposition had employed hyperbole in order to defeat the proposals.2 9
The House majority vote for reform thus suggested contrary interpreta-
tions. Lawyers and judges who identified with the traditional order
could believe that the divisions among the state's local legal establish-
ments were such that reformers were unlikely to achieve a state-wide
consensus supporting their cause.2' Proponents of change recognized,
however, that a House majority reflected wide sources of public discon-
tent that a properly managed campaign might mobilize on behalf of re-
form."
Over the next decade, reform-minded members of the Alabama
State Bar pursued their goal. In 1966, the organization, led by Presi-
dent Howell Heflin, held a Citizen's Conference on Alabama Courts,
which helped to identify the local judges and lawyers who were most
willing to work actively toward reform.' Central to this effort was a
resolution the Alabama State Bar adopted in 1966 calling for the
Legislature to transfer its rule-making authority to the supreme court.m
Unlike the 1957 proposals that required the Legislature to vote on the
rules themselves, the state Bar's resolution simply asked the Legislature
to relinquish a power it had declined to meaningfully exercise any-
way.' 4 Still, in order to succeed, judicial reform had to resolve an in-
terconnected institutional and political problem.' It was not difficult
for critics to describe the traditional order as antiquated. Thus, the
"Alabama system still retains as relics of by-gone days many features
of the court systems of over a century ago; traditions with regard to
judicial processes die hard in the state," wrote Robert J. Frye of The
215. See Clark, supra note 144, at 167-78; Merchant, supra note 148, at 284-97.
216. Talbert B. Fowler, Jr., Available Materials on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 9
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224. See Howell T. Heflin, Symposium: The Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure-Remarks of
the Chief Justice, 25 ALA. L. REv. 663 (1973).
225. See FRYE, supra note 7, at 15-18, 87 (discussing the Alabama Supreme Court).
2001]
Alabama Law Review
University of Alabama in 1969.226 The system nonetheless prevailed
because within the state and local legal establishment were many who
could use the weight of institutional inertia to the benefit of their cli-
ents.
Even so, the traditional system carried its own seeds of discontent.
Following the Second World War, Alabama's population grew un-
evenly; accordingly, in some urban areas the national market created
demands for legal services that the local system could not address. At
the same time, other local courts, especially in rural areas, experienced
no such pressure.7' Although the Alabama Legislature held ultimate
authority over the procedural rules the local courts applied, the Legisla-
ture did not act. As a result, local judges fashioned their own proce-
dure, thereby entrenching their autonomy.228 In addition, the court pro-
cedure existing throughout Alabama was both overly technical, and
diverse.2 9 The field code the Legislature enacted in 1852 established, in
principle, that judges had delegated their common-law rule making au-
thority to the legislative branch. ° In 1969, Supreme Court Justice Pel-
ham Merrill was quoted as affirming the principle concisely: "Our Su-
preme Court has held many times that the 'rule-making power' resides
in the Legislature, and it is my opinion that the Legislature will have to
grant us that power if we are to have it.""' Yet as a practical matter,
the state's decentralized judicial order permitted innumerable common-
law pleadings and, more generally, the rule of procedural technical-
ity.
3 2
As a result, even many of those belonging to the local legal estab-
lishment conceded that technicalities rather than the merits often con-
trolled a suit's outcome.3 Critics pointed to several cases as examples
of form prevailing over substance.24 A basic common law rule was that
pleadings should be strictly construed. 235 In 1909, the Alabama Supreme
Court decided against an injured plaintiff because the lawyer had al-
leged that the "jerk" of the railroad car had caused the fall rather than
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Moreover, the court also rejected the plaintiff's argument because in
describing the defendant the plaintiff's lawyer had omitted the words
"as aforesaid."2" The supreme court had decided the second case as
recently as 1966.38 Again, the plaintiff lost because the formal argu-
ment was stated improperly. 239 The plaintiff had alleged that the defen-
dant Alabama Power Company "failed to maintain its said system of
electric wires ... in a reasonably safe condition." 2' The court denied
the claim because the plaintiff did not allege that the defendant had
"negligently failed to maintain" the wires. 241 Proponents of procedural
reform used such cases to show not only that formalism led to unfair
results, but also that it demonstrated how far Alabama was behind the
times 242
The focus upon the clear deficiencies of procedural formalism
strengthened the appeal of other reform arguments. Failure to address
the problems resulting from technical forms prevailing over a suit's
substantive merits impeded the ability of Alabama law to adapt to
changed postwar economic conditions. Accordingly, the traditional or-
der retarded the growth of the substantive doctrines of tort, contract,
and property, which imposed costs on local and interstate businesses
operating in the national market. In practical terms, reformers aroused
popular concerns that delays inherent in formalism cost money.243 The
persuasiveness of this appeal made credible the reform argument that
centralizing the rule-making authority in the supreme court would ame-
liorate the institutional inertia resulting from uneven legislative inter-
ference and judicial decentralization. 2' This logic in turn established
the reasonableness of the claim that the Legislature should relinquish its
authority over procedure and delegate it to the supreme court.24
Advocating administrative centralization under the supreme court
aided the reformers' arguments in other ways. First, it suggested a de-
fense strategy. Opponents of change could assert that the court aimed
simply to enhance its own power; the reformers could respond, how-
ever, that they sought only an improved organizational efficiency that
clearly was in the best interests of all Alabamians. The focus upon in-
stitutional effectiveness also reflected popular concerns that many law-
yers and judges within the local legal establishment had themselves
237. Id.
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raised. Linking the remedy for a generally recognized problem to the
judiciary itself appealed to those local courts which confronted the
pressures of national market change, while at the same time it isolated
the contrary interests of those localities which remained wedded to the
status quo. In addition, the defense strategy established the legitimacy
of a specific reform Robert Frye suggested in 1969: "Alabama's judi-
cial system could well profit from the creation of an administrative of-
fice to provide a variety of staff functions to the Chief Justice in his
administration of the court system. 24 6 Frye's proposal reflected the
reformers' belief that increased judicial centralization was not a prob-
lem; it was the solution.
During the late 1960s, then, what did "reform" mean to Alabama
lawyers and judges seeking change? At the most practical level it was
understood as a necessary correction to certain institutional problems.
Of course, to the proponents of the status quo the existing regime
worked well enough; indeed, they viewed it as a system that had served
the state adequately throughout the century. So, before the reformers
could advance solutions, they had to redefine the judicial system in
terms that even many of those with a stake in the established order
might agree were legitimate reasons for public concern. The issue of
common law pleading was a conspicuous case in point. The Legisla-
ture's failure to establish a uniform procedure had encouraged perva-
sive diversity across Alabama resulting in entrenched local control.247
Most lawyers and judges survived because they had grasped the essen-
tials of this common law framework. 24' But it was not difficult to show
that undue complexity caused delay and even injustice. Accordingly,
the reformers could gain support from lawyers who were familiar with
the traditional practice by suggesting that attorneys routinely filed nu-
merous demurrers to test complaints; these were followed by the mo-
tions and arguments on those motions.249 After the motion stage, the
lawyer made a series of special pleas and, usually, the judge was asked
to entertain further demurrers and replications." 0 An experienced law-
yer could manage the complexity, but some would clearly abuse it, and
most would agree that inefficiency was a serious problem. 
5 1
Finding support among Alabama's lower court judges presented a
similar tactical challenge. Again, it was necessary to define problems in
terms that suggested incentives for those who would have to adopt re-
forms in their courts, despite the weight of institutional inertia that fa-
246. FRYE, supra note 7, at 20.
247. Id. at 84-87.
248. Id. at 86-87.
249. See Skinner, supra note 140, at 141-42 (discussing demurrers).
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vored traditional local control. Above all, it was necessary to demon-
strate that in return for giving up extensive autonomy, trial judges
would receive administrative and budgetary assistance that would im-
prove the operation of their courts. That these were elected judges was
also not unimportant. Some local judges would count on satisfying the
lawyers and their clients, who were the voters in the community most
interested in judicial elections, by defending the traditional order. Oth-
ers, however, particularly newly elected judges, could see the value of
appealing to those members of the local Bar that understood institu-
tional inefficiency to be a legitimate source of public concern. z2
The most pressing problem was the backlog of docketed cases in the
trial and appellate courts. Yet, here again, the great diversity of juris-
dictions-numbering as many as 400-created further complexity. 3
Some local courts made little effort to resolve docket backlogs, no
doubt because in some cases the clients of members of the local Bar
benefited from the slower process. Other jurisdictions, however, ex-
perienced community pressures for improved service. But, from the
local level to the supreme court, there were no state-wide standards of
administrative efficiency to which all courts might be held. Thus, re-
formers could mobilize judicial support around a call for an office of
court administration. Such an office could provide information based on
the operational needs of the state's whole judicial system; this informa-
tion would in turn establish the means for instituting and enforcing a
reasonable standard of administrative efficiency throughout Alabama. 4
Other institutional problems involved financial control and jury ser-
vice. The system of local judicial autonomy left fundamental budgetary
authority in the hands of county commissioners. 5 Many county com-
missions were concerned primarily with addressing the interests of real
estate and construction industries; particularly the road building indus-
try. 6 If a court generated income, commissioners viewed it with favor.
More generally, however, commissioners found that the opposite was
true: courts were a drain on county budgets. 7 Reformers could gain
support among lower court judges, then, by linking the cause of im-
proved judicial administration to the need for strengthening the finan-
cial independence of the state's entire court system. Moreover, a sure
252. Questionnaire I by Judge Richard Hundley, 8th Judicial Circuit, in Decatur, Ala. (May
22, 1972) in Scroggins, supra note 12, at 15-16. Robert Martin administered the distribution of
these questionnaires to the state's judges during the reform campaign of the first half of the
1970s. Scroggins, supra note 12, at 13-16.
253. See generally sources cited supra note 191.
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way to achieve this goal was to establish a vertical administrative and
budgetary structure under the control of the office of the Chief Justice
of the Alabama Supreme Court.58 By the late 1960s, protracted delay
also affected the administration of the pool of voters from which trial
courts drew jurors. Historically, male members of farming communities
constituted the group of eligible jurors, and, generally, for such indi-
viduals time spent on jury service did not unduly interfere with em-
ployment. 259 But as urban job sectors increasingly characterized Ala-
bama's working population, lengthy periods of jury service added to
employers' scheduling costs which in turn aroused resistance among
potential jurors as well as the wider community. 260 As a result, some
judges perceived that more efficient judicial administration would rem-
edy the problem by shortening the time jurors spent away from their
jobs. 261
Two seemingly minor judicial offices also troubled some members
of the local Bench and Bar. State law established the elected office of
Circuit Court Clerk which local political bosses used as a patronage
post often filled by an aged or infirm party loyalist.262 Accordingly,
managing the procedural minutia upon which a fair and effective judi-
cial process depended often was left to those without professional legal
expertise. Administrative inefficiency was the most common result, but
the political dimension also invited potential favoritism. These prob-
lems, though on a larger scale, also characterized the office of the Jus-
tice of the Peace.263 An elected position established by constitutional
provision, the JP's jurisdiction included numerous misdemeanor of-
fenses, such as drunk driving.2 4 Professional legal training was not
required of those holding the office. 2' Generally, the penalty structure
involved nothing more than the payment of money, which encouraged
what critics called "cash register justice." 2' The system's combination
of weak professionalism and political dependency fostered public doubt
regarding the justice meted out in all local courts. Thus many believed
that the office had outlived its time. Again, reformers found a source of
local discontent they hoped to tap into order to build support for their
258. Byron E. House, Perspectives on Chief Justice Howell Heflin and the Judicial Reforms
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In 1970 the initiative for judicial reform achieved new focus under
Howell Heflin's leadership. Since 1957, members of the State Bar As-
sociation, including many lawyers and judges belonging to the local
legal establishment, had promoted the reform cause; especially through
the 1966 recommendations which had grown out of the Citizens' Con-
ference of the previous year. 26' Robert Frye's insightful academic study
of 1969, which documented the numerous institutional weaknesses that
plagued Alabama's judiciary, further justified the need for reform.269 At
the same time, however, political dislocation identified with George
Wallace's battle against civil rights and the defiance of the federal gov-
ernment suggested that institutional inertia in Alabama was as intracta-
ble as ever.27 These contradictory pressures shaped the reform cam-
paign that Heflin organized and then led during the 1970s.2 71 Clearly,
the content of the procedural and administrative reforms themselves
were not Heflin's own, because they had emerged from the state Bar's
struggle over many years. Still, the state's perennial resistance to
change among those wedded to the traditional order was so deeply
rooted that only strong organization and creative leadership could over-
come it.' Heflin possessed unusual organizational resources and lead-
ership skills; accordingly, his role in the reform process was indispen-
sable.2 3
Heflin ran for election to the office of Chief Justice of the Alabama
Supreme Court. In 1970, the man retiring from that office was J.E.
Livingston who had been a member of the court since the 1940s. Re-
elected with little or no opposition throughout the years, Livingston
represented Alabama's traditional legal establishment. Heflin's bid to
succeed the long-time Chief Justice thus symbolized the expectations of
a new generation of Alabama lawyers, many of whom had become
adults during the Great Depression and the Second World War. Heflin
was born in 1921 into one of North Alabama's prominent families and
graduated from college in 1942. He then went to war in the Pacific
theater. As a member of the United States Marine Corps, Heflin re-
ceived the Silver Star and Purple Heart for courageous combat service.
He then graduated from The University of Alabama School of Law in
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1948 and in less than two decades he had achieved sufficient profes-
sional standing that, in 1965, the Alabama State Bar chose him as its
president.274
Heflin was a member of a successful law firm in Tuscumbia, a
community in northeast Alabama not far from the larger urban areas of
Gadsden and, most importantly, Birmingham, the state's leading metro-
politan center.275 . This locale gave Heflin considerable first hand experi-
ence with the problems facing both big-city and small town lawyers and
courts during Alabama's post war decades. Additionally, over the years
Heflin had pursued organizational solutions that drew upon improved
professional education. From 1957 to 1958, he was a member of the
Alabama Educational Commission.276 At the same time the Bar's reform
recommendations were defeated in the state legislature, the Commission
recognized that legal education could contribute to judicial reform.
From 1964 to 1966, Heflin was President of The University of Alabama
Law School Foundation that deepened his familiarity with the academic
dimensions of reform. 2" He also helped to establish the Alabama Trial
Lawyer's Association, an organization that reflected the interests of
those attorneys most directly affected by the problems that judicial re-
form intended to address.2 78
As Alabama State Bar President and principal organizer of the 1965
Citizens' Conference, Heflin developed a deep understanding of both
the legal and political factors that had to be addressed if reform was to
succeed. 279 As an active member of the Chamber of Commerce, Heflin
also gained an appreciation of the post-war economic conditions that
were unevenly transforming the local market for legal services across
Alabama.280 Moreover, between 1960 and 1970, the total number of
active lawyers practicing law in the state jumped from 1,821 to
2,974.281 This increase created the feeling among young lawyers enter-
ing the profession that a "glut" would hinder their future advance-
ment.282 As State Bar President, Heflin clearly grasped that these con-
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cerns might be addressed through judicial reform. Meanwhile, during
the decade from 1954 to 1964, when resistance to civil rights and fed-
eral authority made Alabama notorious around the world, Heflin was
chairman of the Tuscumbia Board of Education. This position made
Heflin well aware that any effort to change the state's basic institutions
involved finding some way to overcome the political tactics that a few
Senators had used in 1957 to block the reform proposals that a clear
majority of the state's House had passed.283
Running on a platform of judicial reform in the Chief Justice race
involved two other political factors. The first and most important con-
sideration was George Wallace. By 1970, Wallace's grass roots politi-
cal influence was formidable. Unable to succeed himself in 1966, Wal-
lace convinced his wife to run for governor-an election she won-
enabling her husband to maintain political control throughout the
state.284 Mid-way through the four-year term, however, Lurleen Wal-
lace died of cancer, elevating Lieutenant Governor Albert Brewer to the
governorship.285
In the 1970 gubernatorial race, Wallace faced Brewer in what pun-
dits expected to be a brutal campaign.286 At this time, the basic political
necessity for Heflin was to keep his own campaign and the cause of
judicial reform separate and distinct from the gubernatorial race. This
was especially vital, because whoever was elected governor would
greatly influence how the Legislature approached the reform measures
that Heflin would introduce as Chief Justice. Moreover, if Wallace
won, as most informed observers expected, he could exert considerable
pressure upon the Legislature through his extensive local political appa-
ratus, which included lawyers and judges who had the most to lose
from judicial reform.287
The second political factor was the Alabama Constitutional Com-
mission, which the Legislature had established in 1969. The Commis-
sion's charge was to draft a new constitution for Alabama to replace the
one ratified in 1901.288 Civil rights victories in the federal courts had
invalidated the Jim Crow provisions of the Alabama Constitution; how-
ever, there remained many other provisions that had nothing to do with
race, but simply reflected the rural society that had characterized Ala-
also Barlas, supra note 274, at 1.
283. See generally sources cited supra note 5; see also Barlas, supra note 274, at 1.
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bama at the start of the twentieth century.289 Indeed, the judicial article
was one of the provisions that was most in need of change, and the re-
form platform upon which Heflin was campaigning was precisely de-
signed to meet this need.2' Thus, at one level, the Commission's efforts
complimented the judicial reform proposals. At the same time, how-
ever, the Commission's charge of comprehensive constitutional revision
multiplied the challenges to entrenched political interests. The political
question was thus whether full scale constitutional revision would hurt
or strengthen the traditional legal order. These uncertainties compelled
Heflin to craft his reform platform to accentuate greater administrative
efficiency, enhance legal professionalism and, above all, improve legal
services for Alabama's people. In other words, Heflin's campaign em-
phasized strict political neutrality.
Heflin defeated John Patterson in the race for Chief Justice.29' Pat-
terson had served as Alabama's Attorney General and then Governor
during the 1950s and early 1960s.29 While serving in both positions, he
had opposed civil rights and defied the federal government. However,
as a member of the Judicial Commission of 1955 he had supported pro-
cedural reform.293 Thus, by 1970 Patterson represented the state's tradi-
tional legal establishment in defending segregation; on the other hand,
as a member of a leading Montgomery law firm, he defended the sub-
stance of the reform proposed in 1955. 294 Despite this fact, since 1906
Alabama's governors, reflecting the political advantage of a one-party
state, had appointed loyal Democrats as Chief Justice after the current
office holder resigned. This practice gave the appointee the benefit of
incumbency before the electoral campaign even began. It also satisfied
two other political necessities. On one hand, the Democratic leadership
could use the office to reward the faithful while, on the other hand, it
permitted a few individuals like Livingston to remain in office for years
without serious electoral challenge.295 Heflin, however, did not conform
to political custom. His campaign, based as it was on a reform platform
which was not entangled with segregation, employed a new electoral
strategy for judicial office whereby a candidate appealed directly to
voters independent of the Party's traditional legal establishment.2 9 His
289. See generally sourced cited supra note 1; see also supra Part II.
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victory suggested that support for the old order had eroded.
Heflin began a six-year term in January of 1971 and turned to mak-
ing reform a reality. He recruited a staff that would pursue the reform
agenda on several levels at once. First, the staff fashioned the reform
measures into separate packages. Statutory proposals required legisla-
tive enactment alone, whereas constitutional provisions had to be passed
by the Legislature and then approved by a majority vote in a statewide
election. 297 At the same time, the staff used the media to inform the
public about judicial reform that, in turn, put pressure on the Legisla-
ture and governor to give their support.298 Finally, the staff maintained
contact with the lawyers, judges, and members of the general public
who had worked so long on behalf of the reform cause. Meanwhile,
many lawyers and judges, in conjunction with state and community Bar
organizations, used the staff's resources to further promote reform
throughout Alabama. Heflin himself put the office of the Chief Justice
behind all these efforts, and campaigned as vigorously as he had during
the election.29
Several factors contributed to the staff's effectiveness. Heflin put
Charles Y. Cameron in charge of recruiting the staff and coordinating
its functions.3 O Cameron surveyed numerous applications from recent
law school graduates, people with data processing skills, and even those
with experience as military judge advocate generals."' While Cameron
interviewed every applicant, he made each hire in consultation with
Heflin who wanted to ensure not only job fitness, but also that the indi-
vidual would bring the maximum political benefit to the reform
cause. 2 No one was more important in this regard than Robert A.
Martin. A journalist without legal training, Martin was the editor of the
Florence Times Tri-Cities Daily, a position that put him in contact with
both the big-city and small town news media."' He also possessed ex-
cellent communication skills and a wide understanding of the Alabama
political landscape. Martin was well qualified to carry out the charge
Heflin gave him in a memorandum dated March 6, 1972: "[Y]ou are
the one that is to give us new, different and innovative evaluations of
present court systems and fresh and different ideas towards the solution
of the problems."04 Around Cameron and Martin, Heflin established a
loyal staff well equipped to implement the reform agenda.
297. Scroggins, supra note 12, at 17-20.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 12.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Scroggins, supra note 12, at 12.
303. Id. at 13-14.
304. Id. at 13.
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Heflin also had access to national institutional resources that further
strengthened his organization's effectiveness and independence. The
staff and its work received financial and administrative support from
the federal Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. 35 The LEAA
was a federally funded agency that provided grants to assist local com-
munities to address a wide range of issues, including judicial reform. In
the agency's Atlanta office, Heflin established an excellent working
relationship with William Herndon, Chief Courts Specialist for the
southeast region. 3°6 Herndon's office provided Heflin and his staff with
technical and qualitative data concerning judicial reform throughout the
region and nation; Herndon also assisted Alabamians in the procure-
ment of federal grants that included the funding of staff positions,
thereby reducing dependency on the limited state budgetary alloca-
tions. 307 Heflin also maintained budgetary independence in funding the
Second Citizen's Conference on Alabama State Courts during April 5-
7, 1973.308 Unlike its predecessor in 1966, which had modest public
impact, the Second Conference was central to a successful public rela-
tions campaign that mobilized considerable popular support for the re-
form program.3' The American Judicature Society, in conjunction with
the Alabama State Bar and other professional organizations, sponsored
the Conference. 3'0 Heflin's ability to procure external sources of fund-
ing and professional expertise both broadened the reach of the reform
campaign and reinforced its independence from the state's traditional
power centers.3 '
Since the mid-1950s many Alabama lawyers and judges were aware
of the problems facing legal order. They had a reasonably clear idea,
too, of the following necessary substantive reforms: establish a state-
wide uniform procedure modeled on the Federal Rules, have the Legis-
lature delegate rule-making authority to the supreme court, institute the
court's centralized administrative authority over all trial and appellate
courts throughout Alabama, and abolish such venerable local offices as
the Justice of the Peace.312 However, implementation of the program
meant that certain state and local officials would lose the power upon
which their constituent's interests had depended during most of the
twentieth century. Unquestionably, the economic nationalization Ala-
bama was undergoing facilitated a new market for legal services that
305. Id. at 12.
306. Id. at 25-27.
307. Scroggins, supra note 12, at 13.
308. Id. at 27.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 13.
312. See Heflin, supra note 4, at 264; see also Martin, supra note 5, at 10-11.
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encouraged growing numbers of the state's lawyers and judges to favor
change. But Alabama's defiant resistance to the civil rights struggle
suggested both how intractable the traditional power structure was and
that the same power structure had defeated judicial reform in the
past."' Whether the reform measures could establish institutional effi-
ciency thus depended upon meeting the political challenge. Heflin's
staff and its centralized organization under the office of Chief Justice
nonetheless gave the reform cause an advantage it had not possessed
before. 4 A final political factor was that Wallace, who also won elec-
tion in 1970, had told Heflin he would not, in principle, oppose judicial
reform; what that meant, exactly, Heflin would learn as the reform
campaign moved forward." 5
IV. JUDICIAL REFORM AND CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION SUCCEED
Heflin's reform campaign went through two principal phases before
ending in 1975. In the first phase, the reformers mobilized the legal
profession's support for legislative action alone; by contrast, the second
phase required winning not only legislative approval, but also state-
wide electoral votes in favor of constitutional amendments. Heflin's
electoral victory over Patterson indicated that the support for the re-
form platform was greater than that for the traditional order. However,
the need to procure both legislative and constitutional enactments mul-
tiplied the opportunities for the opposition to employ political maneu-
vers and ideological appeals like those which had defeated reform in
1957. This was the challenge the reformers had to meet. Moreover,
while Heflin had a six-year term, he knew that to avoid entangling re-
form in another gubernatorial race, the program had to succeed by
1975.316
Beginning in the spring of 1971, Heflin presented to the Legislature
the initial package of proposals. Broadly, the measures strengthened the
authority of the Chief Justice's office. Technically, state law required
the Chief Justice to oversee the operation of all courts throughout the
state; but the Legislature had never conferred upon that office the for-
mal authority to establish an administrative structure to do so. Accord-
313. See discussion supra Parts I, II.
314. Scroggins, supra note 12, at 6; see also Sean P. Costello, Modernizing Alabama Justice:
How Heflin Moved the State's Court System Into the 20th Century 9 (1997) (unpublished student
paper, The University of Alabama School of Law) (on file with Alabama Law Review); House,
supra note 258, at 6.
315. House, supra note 258, at 16-18.
316. Cole, supra note 5, at 53; Costello, supra note 314, at 9; See Heflin, supra note 4, at
264; House, supra note 258, at 6-13; Johnson, supra note 2, at 855; Martin, supra note 5, at 10-
11; Scroggins, supra note 12, at 6-20.
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ingly, among the first reforms the legislature approved was a Depart-
ment of Court Management. Under the auspices of the Chief Justice,
the Department compiled statistics that enabled the staff to develop a
realistic operational profile of all courts throughout the state. This pro-
file especially accounted for caseload disposition and docket backlogs.
Based upon survey data from each judicial circuit in Alabama, the
Chief Justice instituted a program to use supernumerary judges and
judges from rural circuits with light caseloads to alleviate the backlog.
The legislature also passed laws creating the same sort of system to
resolve the appellate courts' backlog problems. Legislators also enacted
measures which provided for continuing judicial training, other educa-
tional programs and the mandatory retirement of judges. 317 The Legisla-
ture also created a permanent commission empowered to study and
make recommendations for Alabama's judicial system.318
Procuring the supreme court's control over rule-making was the
most important reform of the initial stage. Locating this power in the
Legislature weakened the judiciary's independence and the accountabil-
ity inherent in constitutional checks and balances. Ironically, the Legis-
lature had failed to act, leaving a policy vacuum filled by discretionary
formalism which in turn promoted a decentralized judicial order domi-
nated by localism. 3 9 Getting the Legislature to relinquish its power to
the court thus had been, according to one commentator, "sought by
jurists and commentators for almost three decades." 32' As a practical
matter, granting the court an authority to make its own rules of plead-
ing and procedure facilitated administrative autonomy at the top, which
in turn enabled the court to establish organizational centralization down
to the grass roots level. Although the reform directly affected the su-
preme court, its broader impact was upon Alabama's entire judicial
system, including the interests of lawyers and judges across the state.
One observer summarizes succinctly what was at stake: "Because of
enlightened legislation, prompt and efficient action, and the necessary
support from the Bench and Bar, the Alabama state courts will experi-
ence a long overdue reform of [our] court procedures."
321
Led by Heflin, the reformers' lobbying of the Legislature suc-
ceeded. The 1971 session ended with legislation which gave the su-
preme court the authority to make its own rules of procedure. 3 2 The
triumph was nonetheless just the first step in achieving procedural uni-
317. Martin, supra note 5, at 10-11.
318. See Cole, supra note 5, at 67-70.
319. See id. at 48-52.
320. Id. at 52.
321. Id. at 52-53.
322. Martin, supra note 130, at 11.
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formity throughout the entire system. 323 With input from the staff and
other reform-minded individuals, Heflin appointed an Advisory Com-
mittee to develop new rules for Alabama practice and procedure.324
While the committee clearly possessed the necessary technical exper-
tise, it also reflected the interests of lawyers, judges, and academics
who were active in the reform campaign. 325 Drawing upon the resources
of such national organizations as the LEAA and the American Judica-
ture Society, the committee modeled its recommendations upon the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.326 In 1957, opponents of reform had
defeated similar reform proposals in the Legislature because they were
identified with the federal government.327 The reform was politically
vulnerable because legislators held direct power over what the rules
were to be. Sixteen years later, the reform proposals grew out of au-
thority the supreme court itself possessed. 328 After public comment and
review, the Alabama Supreme Court unanimously promulgated the Ala-
bama Rules of Civil Procedure on January 3, 1973, to become effective
six months later.329
The same process of committee expertise and mobilization of public
support resulted two years later in the court adopting the new Alabama
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 330 Earlier, the Legislature had approved
Heflin's request for legislation to increase the number of judges on the
court of criminal appeals from three to five. 33' Taken as a whole, the
new system of trial and appellate procedure under the centralized ad-
ministration of the supreme court transformed the operation of Ala-
bama's legal order. By mid-1972 the court had eliminated its own
caseload backlog; within a short time the caseload of the intermediate
civil and criminal appellate courts were similarly eliminated.332 In trial
courts throughout the state there was basic uniformity in the rules of
pleading and practice, which meant that technical formalism reflecting
the interests of local legal establishment no longer controlled the merits
or the outcome of cases.333 In addition, Alabama now possessed an edu-
cational and administrative apparatus that worked to the advantage of
the Bench and Bar across the state and kept them abreast of legal prac-
323. Costello, supra note 314, at 10; see Scroggins, supra note 12, at 6-8; see also House,
supra note 258, at 6-7.
324. Scroggins, supra note 12, at 9.
325. Heflin, supra note 4, at 264.
326. BELKNAP, supra note 12, at 194-202, 228-32, 238-39, 245; Heflin, supra note 4, at 264-
65.
327. See Heflin, supra note 4, at 264.
328. See Heflin, supra note 4, at 264; see also Martin, supra note 5, at 10-11.
329. Heflin, supra note 4, at 265.
330. See Walker, supra note 7, at 144.
331. Howell Heflin, State of the Judiciary, 33 ALA. LAW. 371, 372 (1972).
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tice throughout the nation.334
The second phase of reform required changing the Alabama Consti-
tution's judicial article. The reforms enacted between 1971 and 1973
could only be achieved through legislative action.335 What the Legisla-
ture gave, however, it could withdraw under altered political circum-
stances. Indeed, both the old order that had evolved over seven decades
and the new system of reforms emerged from the constitution's article
VI, which granted the Legislature extensive control over the judici-
ary.336 In phase two, the reformers sought to incorporate the reforms
they had won into a new constitutional article which would strengthen
the judiciary's independence from the Legislature. Now that the Legis-
lature had granted rule-making and administrative authority to the judi-
cial branch, the reformers wanted to make it as difficult as possible for
the Legislature to reverse the process in the future. Even so, constitu-
tional revision demanded political action: the Legislature would first
have to adopt the proposed revision, and then submit it for approval by
the people in a state-wide vote. Thus, Heflin and the reform campaign
would have to extend their organizational initiative to convince not only
legislators, but also voters across Alabama that a more independent
judiciary would better serve the public welfare.337
The reformers pursued their goal through the process of constitu-
tional amendment. 38 The first step was an amendment abolishing the
Justice of the Peace (JP), an office which required no formal legal
training and was subject to local political influence. 339 Removing the
JP's jurisdiction over a wide range of minor offenses opened the way to
instituting a new system of local courts subject to professional legal
standards. 30 The creation of these courts was included in more compre-
hensive structural and substantive provisions incorporated into a second
constitutional amendment: amendment 328, which formally replaced
article VI of the 1901 Constitution. 34 1 The new constitutional article
stated that the "chief justice of the supreme court shall be the adminis-
trative head of the judicial system [and] [h]e shall appoint an adminis-
trative director of courts and other needed personnel to assist him with
his administrative tasks." 34" The section that followed granted the su-
preme court the power to "make and promulgate rules governing . . .
334. Heflin, supra note 4, at 372; Martin, supra note 5, at 14-17.
335. Martin, supra note 5, at 14-17.
336. Heflin, supra note 4, at 263; see also Martin, supra note 5, at 10-11.
337. See House, supra note 258, at 9-12; see Scroggins, supra note 12, at 6-9; see also
Costello, supra note 314, at 19-26.
338. Cole, supra note 5, at 53.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 56-57.
341. ALA. CONST. amend. 328.
342. Id. § 6.10.
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practice and procedure in all courts."343 Amendment 328 thus incorpo-
rated the first phase reforms into a complete revision of the constitu-
tion's judicial article. Overall, within a single constitutional text, it uni-
fied some 400 courts into a three-tiered system, provided uniform juris-
diction for all trial courts, sanctioned flexible assignment of judges, and
established a centralized judicial administration within a permanent or-
ganizational structure. 3"
The passage of amendment 328 coincided with the wider movement
for constitutional revision underway since 1969. Heflin and his staff
worked closely with the chairman of the Alabama Constitutional Com-
mission, Shelby County Probate Judge Conrad Fowler. 345 The Commis-
sion popularized the idea that the Constitution of 1901 needed chang-
ing; it soon became apparent, however, that there was not enough sup-
port within the Legislature to adopt wholesale constitutional reform.346
Heflin then convinced Fowler and his colleagues that only one provi-
sion should be submitted to the Legislature for approval: the proposed
judicial article, amendment 328. Crafting the amendment in the sub-
stantive terms that were already law made it unlikely that the Legisla-
ture would reject the same principles introduced as constitutional lan-
guage.348 Even so, this strategy required Heflin's reform campaign to
omit from its amendment a recommendation to select judges through a
merit process which would end the state's practice of popular election
of judges. 349 Heflin knew that even among Alabama's reform-minded
judges there was little support for doing away with direct judicial elec-
tion and so, ultimately, the principle was not incorporated in the pro-
posed amendment.350
The campaign to win approval for the constitutional article appealed
to two distinct groups. Most important for legislative adoption were the
legal professionals, the judges and lawyers, many of whom the reform-
ers had already mobilized during the successful first phase. Yet, pas-
sage of the constitutional amendment required support from all seg-
ments of Alabama's people.351 Martin, Heflin's chief public relations
343. Id. § 6.11.
344. Costello, supra note 314, at 12-13; House, supra note 258, at 12; Martin, supra note 5,
at 17; see also Scroggins, supra note 12, at 11-16; Ben Wilson, The Alabama Supreme Court as
an Administrator of the Judiciary 6-7 (1995) (unpublished student paper, The University of Ala-
bama School of Law) (on file with Alabama Law Review).
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tactician, noted the distinction between the two constituencies: "The
lawyers and the judges could work behind the scenes, but support
[from] persons in labor, the professions and business would have to be
in the forefront" in a state-wide voter drive on behalf of the constitu-
tional amendment. 352 Heflin, along with many members of the state's
Bench and Bar carried on an active speaking campaign throughout Ala-
bama, tailoring comments to the expectations of legal professionals and
lay people alike.353 Heflin also got the state's Educational Television
System to air programs aimed at informing legal professionals, while
Martin led the way in cultivating the big-city and small town media.354
Perhaps the most conspicuous public relations effort was the Second
Citizens' Conference on Alabama State Courts. While it built upon the
network established during the 1965 conference, with added funding
from the American Judicature Society and in-state organizations, the
Second Conference had a wider public impact than the first.355 Over 200
citizens from throughout the state and all walks of life met in Birming-
ham's Thomas Jefferson Hotel on the first weekend of April 1973.356
The conference received media coverage across Alabama.357 The focus
of attention was the proposed judicial article.358 Within a month the
Legislature would convene in Montgomery and vote whether to send it
to the people. A nationally reported Associated Press story conveyed
the Conference's success. 35 9 "A citizens' group Saturday recommended
sweeping changes in the state's judicial system and urged the legislature
to let the voters decide the fate of a proposed Judicial Article for the
Alabama Constitution," it read.3 ' A "consensus statement" confirmed
that "vast improvements have occurred in the judicial system in the past
two years . . . [b]ut the group said it found additional improvements
and reforms necessary for the judicial branch to function properly. )
36'
As the article headed into the legislative session Heflin addressed
two concerns. First, he had to temper the enthusiasm of certain reform
voices in the Conference who urged the inclusion of a merit selection of
judges provision in the amendment. 362 According to Martin, Heflin con-
vinced the group to put the issue "on the back burner. 363 The real chal-
352. Martin, supra note 5, at 14.
353. Id. at 18.
354. Id. at 12, 17-18.
355. See id. at 14.
356. Id. at 15.
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lenge came from probate judges and rural attorneys, backed up by small
town newspapers, "who fe[lt] that the article centralize[d] judicial
power. "0 64 But the reformers had done their work well; led by State
Senator Stewart O'Bannon and Representative Ronnie Flippo, the Leg-
islature approved the article on the last day of the 1973 regular ses-
sion.36 On December 18, 1973, Alabama's citizens would vote in a
special election to approve or reject amendment 328. 3' 6 Again, the re-
form campaign went into action. A speaker's bureau organized the
presentation of over one hundred talks at civic clubs throughout the
state favoring the measure's adoption.367 During the two months prior to
the vote, Heflin himself delivered more than fifty speeches, including
television appearances; on one occasion he spoke before 100 of Ala-
bama's journalists at a "Media Seminar on Alabama Courts." 368 The
reformers garnered the endorsement of some forty-five organizations,
including twenty state-wide groups, and twenty of the twenty-five daily
newspapers including all those in the major cities. 369 The Montgomery
Advertiser stated that it was "the most significant amendment to face
the voters since the 1901 constitution was adopted."
370
Amendment 328 passed with the support of 62% of Alabama's vot-
ers, but victory was incomplete.37' Portions of the judicial article went
into effect immediately, but others, particularly because they raised
budgetary concerns, required formal legislation. 372 The amendment
stipulated a four-year period in which the Legislature could address
these issues, but Heflin did not want to risk delay. 373 By early June of
1974 he had appointed fifty-five members to a Judicial Article Imple-
mentation Committee.374 Within a year the Committee had prepared a
168-page bill and submitted it to the Legislature. 375 There was consider-
able debate, especially over the funding provisions; but with 25 of 35
senators and 72 of 105 House members expressing formal support, the
bill passed easily by a vote of 100-to-1 in the House and 30-to-0 in the
Senate.376 On October 10, 1975, Governor George Wallace signed the
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The triumph of judicial reform engendered contrasting evaluations
within and outside Alabama. While the reforms themselves involved
technical matters obscure to most laypersons, contemporary journalistic
and legal commentary alike agreed that their successful implementation
had a broader public significance.378 Stories appearing in the New York
Times and Washington Post in 1975 and 1977 presented the reform
movement as a measure of positive change in Alabama following the
most painful years of civil rights struggle. 379 The title of a survey article
published in The Economist of London in 1978 suggested this perspec-
tive most pointedly, asking "Is There Life After Wallace?" 380 Such
largely political assessments focused upon Heflin's leadership, suggest-
ing that it represented the emergence of more moderate Southern public
officials who rejected the confrontational style Wallace symbolized. 38
Even national organizations of legal professionals such as the Judicature
Society, which clearly understood the substantive character of the re-
forms, emphasized the chief justice's role. 3" The perspective of Ala-
bama's commentators was nonetheless more muted on this point: it
gave Heflin due recognition as a "catalyst" for reform, but viewed his
involvement as indicative of a broad movement among the state's law-
yers to "seize [their] profession. ,383
These differing views about the meaning of reform suggested cer-
tain ironies. Employing the reforms as a measure of political change
away from the intractable states' rights regime identified with Wallace's
defiance of federally enforced racial justice ignored the fact that Wal-
lace quietly signed the reforms into law without opposition. 38' The focus
of national professional organizations upon Heflin's leadership inade-
quately recognized that the Chief Justice succeeded largely because
Alabama already possessed the elements of an active reform movement
that he could effectively mobilize. 385 Thus, the Alabama commentators
were clearly correct to emphasize the stake the legal profession as a
whole had in establishing more efficient procedure and process, and
given that the reforms would have likely failed had not many lawyers
and judges been so involved, it is reasonable to view the successful
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outcome in terms of professional empowerment.386 But ultimately,
achieving victory was impossible without the support of the great mass
of Alabama voters to whom appeals of professional interest meant little.
The reform strategy aimed at winning over the general public was dif-
ferent, then, from that targeting the legal profession, which explained
why the reform campaign involved two distinct phases.3 7
The first phase strategy required consolidating support among legal
professionals. During the first year-and-a-half of his tenure as Chief
Justice, Heflin worked to inform local judges about the benefits of lo-
cating the rule-making authority in the supreme court. Early in 1971 he
called upon all newly-elected circuit judges to attend a four-day orienta-
tion program.388 The first of its kind in the nation, the program pre-
sented these new members of the judiciary the most recent innovations
in court administration and process that were being developed by na-
tional reform organizations such as the Judicature Society and the
LEAA.3 89 These judges had less of a stake in the problematic system of
pleading and procedure than their more experienced colleagues, and so
were more likely to be receptive to change. In addition, Martin circu-
lated questionnaires among local judges soliciting views regarding the
practical problems their courts faced on a daily basis as well as recom-
mended solutions. 390 Data collection was only one goal of the question-
naire process; it also offered the resources of the new Department of
Management to assist judges in improving court administration.39' Mar-
tin often visited judges to reinforce how important their opinions and
needs were to both the Department of Management and the Chief Jus-
tice. 3 2
Heflin pursued a similar strategy with lawyers practicing before the
local courts. Under the Chief Justice's leadership, the staff organized a
series of seminars, educational programs, symposiums and meetings
conducted by local Bar associations, the state Bar, and the law schools.
In order to reach as many members of the Bar and Bench as possible,
Heflin succeeded in getting the legal education programs presented on
the Educational Television System. 393 Recalling that, in 1957, oppo-
386. See id. at 10.
387. See Scroggins, supra note 12, at 5-6 (concluding that "the first wave of reform laid the
groundwork without which the second wave would have been impossible."). See generally Mar-
tin, supra note 5, at 14 (stating that "support from persons in labor, the professions and business
would have to be in the forefront for revision of the judicial portion of the 1901 Constitution to
be successful.").
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nents had derailed the adoption of procedural reform by linking it to
anger over "federal rules," Heflin's educational programs ignored the
issue.3 4 Instead, as had been the case with the judges, the educational
process focused directly upon the objective benefits. 395 Thus, Heflin and
the staff used the educational forums to demonstrate just what lawyers
would gain if the legislature relinquished its rule-making authority to
the supreme court.396 The emphasis was upon how a uniform procedure
operating throughout the state, administered under the court's central-
ized authority, would equalize the access of lawyers and their clients to
a consistent system of justice.39
A strategy aimed at consolidating Bench and Bar support implicitly
recognized a vital demographic reality. Wide involvement in profes-
sional legal and business organizations made Heflin keenly aware that
the state's post-war economic growth had a profound but uneven impact
on the legal profession's support for the traditional order.3 98 The Ala-
bama State Bar's membership had grown by over 50% during the
1960s; from 1970 to 1980, the membership would nearly double, from
2,974 to 5,788. 399 The legal profession's impressive rate of growth
meant that there were more lawyers than ever before who lacked a deep
attachment to the decentralization and procedural formalism that his-
torically characterized Alabama's system of local control. The special
attention that Heflin gave to newly elected circuit judges in his four-day
orientation seminar, as well as the broad ranging educational programs
he provided for the legal profession as a whole, appealed directly to the
interests of the profession's newest members.4" Moreover, many of
these new lawyers and judges pursued their careers in the state's grow-
ing urban areas, among a population of potential clients whose expecta-
tions were contrary to the delay and sporadic abuse inherent in the es-
tablished order. In these same urban areas were many experienced law-
yers already wrestling with the demands of the new market for legal
services.40' Although the perception of a "glut" of lawyers reflected
increasing competition, many of those same lawyers could see advan-
tages for client representation in adopting the new system Heflin was
publicizing. 2
Additionally, for the judges holding court in the growing urban cen-
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ters, the promise of improved administrative efficiency was appealing.
A circuit judge from Decatur responded to Martin's questionnaire, stat-
ing: "[I]t is difficult for some judges to know what is going on in their
own courts other than from a general and instinctive position."43 He
welcomed the assistance of the Department of Court Management be-
cause, if it "can put into finite terms the financial, personnel and
equipment needs of the courts over this state sufficiently adequate to
handle the present case loads and project them into the reasonably near
future, a great service will have been done. "44 He also recognized how
administrative centralization freed the court from the county commis-
sion's budgetary influence: "The financial needs of courts should be
submitted vertically . . . [to] judicial persons, who are able to evaluate
the needs realistically and grant or deny them according to judicial con-
cepts and not according to road building theories."4 5
The judge suggested more generally how reform of the established
order benefited Alabama's changing society. Doing away with the Jus-
tice of the Peace paved the way for:
a uniform system of inferior courts . . . . In my judgment the
problem of the drinking driver will never be solved until there
is uniformity of enforcement of the highway laws throughout
the width and breadth of this state in uniform courts using uni-
form procedure and practice and punishments.'
He also embraced the idea of ending the elected office of the Cir-
cuit Clerk and replacing it with an enlarged administrative staff whose
selection and operation was directly under judicial control.4W Finally,
he suggested that the legal order had to adapt to changing times, espe-
cially in Alabama's increasingly urbanized northern section. The tradi-
tional order was rooted in:
a nineteenth century concept which was designed to function to
the end of providing justice for a people that lived on the land
in rural communities and who were able and willing to take the
time and effort to come to court either as witnesses or jurors
and proceed with interest and due deliberation to the ends of
justice in criminal and civil cases. 4°8
By 1972, at least in his circuit in the Tennessee Valley, Hundley felt
403. House, supra note 258, at app. 2.
404. Id.
405. Id. at 3.
406. Id.
407. Id. at 8-9.
408. House, supra note 258, at app. 9.
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that "we do not have that sort of society, background or interest. ,409
These factors help to clarify the strategy Heflin pursued to win pas-
sage of the first phase of reform. In 1957, despite a positive majority
vote in the House, procedural reform was vulnerable to defeat in the
Senate on ideological grounds, as the Legislature was deciding upon the
substantive rules themselves.4 0 In order to avoid a recurrence of this
situation, Heflin did not raise with the Legislature the content of the
procedures; instead, he simply asked the Legislature to relinquish its
rule-making authority to the supreme court.4 Prior to proposing this
change, however, Heflin consolidated the support of a large number of
lawyers and local judges by demonstrating that greater administrative
efficiency ameliorated the problems they faced as a result of Alabama's
changing market for legal services. 42 Through an extensive educational
process, he in turn, convinced these legal professionals that administra-
tive efficiency was best achieved through the supreme court's central-
ized organization. 4 ' Thus, by the time the Legislature voted to give up
rule-making power to the supreme court, Heflin's organization had dif-
fused potential opposition.
Other factors worked in favor of reform. During the same session,
in which Heflin introduced the reform bill, the legislature was consider-
ing a wide range of taxation, bond, mental health, educational, and
congressional redistricting measures, as well as hundreds of local pro-
posals.4 14 Under such circumstances, a majority of legislators in both
houses could have viewed the strong support lawyers and judges gave
the bill as indicating that the best political move would be to satisfy the
influential constituency by turning over rule-making authority to the
court. Moreover, Heflin had successfully detached from the issue any
symbolic content susceptible to populist hyperbole, thereby reducing it
to a technical matter possessing meaning only for the same legal profes-
sionals the reform organization had so effectively mobilized prior to
legislative action. 41 ' Accordingly, the Montgomery Advertiser, the state
paper that gave the most in-depth coverage to legislative matter, did not
even mention that Heflin's bill passed unanimously in the House and by
a vote of 22-to-10 in the Senate.41 6 Wallace signed the bill into law on
September 17, 1971 .417 He had, of course, advised Heflin during the
409. Id.
410. See sources cited supra notes 202-07.
411. Heflin, supra note 4, at 264.
412. Scroggins, supra note 12, at 5.
413. See generally sources cited supra notes 243, 254-55, 259-60.
414. Don F. Wasson, Mountain of Work Awaits Legislature, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER,
Sept. 19, 1971, at 12A.
415. See generally sources cited supra notes 202-07.
416. Don F. Wasson, supra note 365, at 12A (failing to mention passage ofjudicial reform).
417. Act of Sept. 17, 1971, No. 1311, 1971 Ala. Acts 2259-60.
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election that, as governor, he would not oppose reform. Even so, one
of Wallace's closest advisors later observed that the governor's staff
had studied the reform measure and had not objected as long as there
was no attempt made to end popular election of judges.4"8 Apparently,
Wallace was also distracted because he was preparing to run for the
United States Presidency in 1972, and had little reason to give state
judicial reform a high priority.4 9 Thus, the first phase of reform passed
because Heflin's strategy and the reformers' effective campaign coin-
cided with a Legislature and a governor preoccupied with more press-
ing concerns.
The reformers employed a different strategy to achieve the constitu-
tional restructuring of Alabama's judicial branch. Unlike the first phase
of the relief movement, the support of legal professionals alone was
insufficient to win passage of a constitutional revision on the scale of
amendment 328. Not only did the process of legislative approval, state-
wide referendum and, then, legislative implementation demand mobili-
zation of voter opinion throughout the state, but the budgetary require-
ments suggested taxation concerns.4 20 Political dimensions of this scope
increased the opportunities for opposition to exert pressure. Admit-
tedly, the successful abolition of the Justice of the Peace in 1972 sug-
gested that one of Alabama's most venerable constitutional offices was
too politically isolated to resist the well organized reform campaign.42'
Wallace's unwillingness to defend the JPs indicated their political impo-
tence. Although Wallace had benefited from their support throughout
his long reign of power, he declined to intervene on behalf of the JPs
during either the legislative or referendum processes that ended the of-
fice.4" Still, this triumph, notwithstanding any symbolic significance it
may have represented, was of secondary importance, compared to the
more diverse political challenge amendment 328 raised.
Above all, the phase two strategy recognized the need to reach Ala-
bama's voters as a whole. The procedural and rule-making issues ad-
dressed in the first stage of reform were commented upon primarily
among legal professionals themselves and within the Legislature, where
media attention was insignificant."2 By contrast, the lobbying effort
which mobilized political support for legislative crafting of amendment
328 itself, ratification in the state-wide referendum, and, finally, legis-
lative implementation and funding, received considerable, ongoing pub-
418. Interview with John M. Karrh, Circuit Judge (Retired), supra note 350, at 7.
419. Rich Oppel, Wallace to Enter Florida Demo Primary Today, MONTGOMERY
ADVERTISER, Jan. 13, 1972, at lA.
420. See Martin, supra note 5, at 14.
421. Cole, supra note 5, at 53-55.
422. Interview with John M. Karrh, Circuit Judge (Retired), supra note 350, at 8.
423. See Cole, supra note 5, at 52-53; Martin, supra note 5, at 14.
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lic scrutiny. Not surprisingly, it was during this process of constitu-
tional revision that vocal criticism arose from within the rural legal
establishment. 424 The focus of criticism was not on procedural techni-
calities, but on the threat judicial centralization presented to community
self control. One small town editorial summed up the danger by re-
minding its readers of Governor Wallace's frequent rage against federal
courts interfering in Alabama's grass roots government, and by specu-
lating that a more centralized state judiciary might pose a similar
evil.4' The broad based support the Second Citizens Conference gar-
nered within the state's business, civic, and labor groups was indicative
of the reformers skill in countering such attacks.426 Indeed, Heflin's
initiative, which resulted in maintaining judicial election-consistent
with Wallace's expectations-enabled the reformers to argue that
amendment 328 left democratic control of the new system to all of Ala-
bama's people.427
V. CONCLUSION
Reforming the judicial article of Alabama's 1901 Constitution rep-
resented a formidable challenge. During the first half of the twentieth
century, the state's vested interests employed the constitution's judicial
power to resist change. Alabama's small-town society, one-party poli-
tics, and tenacious adherence to preserving white racial supremacy rein-
forced the constitutional sanction of the status quo. By the 1960s, the
ascendancy of an urban population within the state and its increased
integration within the nation's post-war consumer economy eroded the
established order's foundations. However, seizing the potential these
changes offered depended upon three socio-cultural factors. First, it
was necessary to mobilize Alabama's legal profession, particularly
younger lawyers and judges having a stake in the new market for legal
services. Effective mobilization, in turn, required leadership possessing
unusual organizational skills, strategic vision, and personal credibility.
In addition, the leader had to appeal successfully to legal professionals
and laypersons alike. Howell Heflin was, of course, just such a leader.
The third factor was George Wallace: his approval of the reform effort
undercut the racially coded, anti-federal government demagoguery
which had defeated constitutional judicial reform during the mid-1950s.
An understanding of how these socio-cultural factors worked in con-
junction with demographic and market changes suggests the significance
424. See House, supra note 258, at 10.
425. Id. (citing Editorial, MOBILE PRESS REGISTER, Jan. 19, 1974, at D2).
426. See Martin, supra note 5, at 15.
427. Interview with Circuit Judge (Retired) John M. Karrh, supra note 350, at 7.
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of the successful reform of the Alabama Constitution's judicial article.

